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This report targets a specific pattern in the outcomes related to the Arab uprisings in 2011 and 
uses them to make a broader argument about the psycho-social dynamics of autocratic rule and 
resistance.  It asks, what explains the broad trend of the 2011 Arab uprisings that saw the leaders of 
Arab republics pushed out of their positions of power, while monarchies were left largely unscathed? 
Common institutional, structural, and strategic explanations for the varying stability of Arab regimes 
across type elide a crucial mechanism of autocratic strength related to legitimacy, affect, and the varying 
patterns of social identity in the Arab world.  Utilizing recent research in psychology, leadership, and 
identity studies, this report argues that monarchies were largely able to prevent and manage mass 
opposition because of the affective position they inherited and maintained through a pattern of 
historical continuity and modern development that better suit the monarchies of the Middle East. 
Further, I argue that this variation along regime-type reflects a broader shift in the political dynamics of 
the Middle East, with behavioral and ideational factors taking on a greater relevance to understanding 
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During the mass uprisings of 2011 in the Arab world, nearly all of the now-fallen or struggling 
republics of the Arab world attempted to appease protests by offering promises of reform, with a few 
rulers even offering to step down voluntarily and turn over a nascent reform process to other state 
actors.  Yet for the most part, the citizens of these republics rejected these offers, labeling them as 
empty promises and pointing toward past examples of tendentious reform pledges from the regime.  In 
fact, often the reaction to offers of reform was increased anger among the population, and renewed 
commitment to full regime change (Shadid and Kirkpatrick 2011).  In both cases, efforts to diffuse 
opposition through limited concessions was spectacularly unsuccessful.  Following this failed strategy, 
dictators were forced to use violence against protestors (Syria, Libya) or were forced out of power by 
the opposition and/or other political actors in the government (Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and now Algeria 
and Sudan). 
 Contrast the experiences of republic dictators to their contemporary colleagues in the Arab 
monarchies, and a different picture emerges.  Of the three Arab monarchies that saw significant protest 
activity, only one was forced to resort to significant repression tactics (Bahrain), whereas the two poor, 
politically-limited monarchs of the region (Morocco, Jordan) were able to quell protests with promises 
of reform and superficial political deck shuffling.  In Morocco, Mohammad VI promised a new 
constitution, one in which small concessions were made to political parties – themselves largely 
complicit in state control – and did little to devolve power from the king or strengthen civil society 
(Benchemsi 2012).  Following his announcement, protest activity dipped significantly and faded 
altogether by the time the new constitution was ratified (Barany 2013). Likewise, in Jordan, Abdullah II 
was able to effectively reduce the scale of protests around the country by dissolving the parliament and 
also promising a new constitution, both of which were strategies the monarchy had engaged in 
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previously, and neither of which constituted significant political reform (Yom and Gause III 2012). Yet, 
citizens of Jordan and Morocco seemed relatively satisfied with these essentially incredible – as opposed 
to credible – promises; at least, a large portion of them returned to their home, with no guarantee of 
significant change and a history of broken promises similar to their partners in Arab republics.  What 
explains the discrepancy in the effects of reform commitments between the monarchies and the 
republics?  Why did similar offers of reform – offers that had worked well previously in both regime 
types – inspire opposition and indignation in the republics while demobilizing protests in the Jordan and 
Morocco?   
 I address this question by proposing a novel causal mechanism from social psychology that 
highlights the role of political leaders in the construction and maintenance of social group identities, the 
constraints imposed upon them by the association of group identities with significant past political 
events, and their subsequent ability to communicate effectively during times of political crises (i.e. their 
ability to effectively demobilize opposition).  The post-independence, nationalist projects of the Arab 
republics forged cohesive, but ultimately unstable national identities that collapsed in the face of 1) 
poor economic, political, and military performance on the part of the Arab republics and 2) the inability 
(or unwillingness) of subsequent leaders to embody the leadership qualities of past nationalist leaders, 
further destabilizing foundational identities and attenuating the leader’s position as a legitimate 
medium of communication during crisis.  Conversely, the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco largely 
avoided (or coopted) assimilating nationalist projects in the post-independence period, leaving room for 
the construction and maintenance of multi-faceted – and thereby more stable – identity structures that 
1) could accommodate aspects of both traditional and modern political identities and 2) placed the 
monarch squarely at the top as a neutral arbiter of diverse social coalitions.  Additionally, the monarchs 
themselves invested significant effort to embody the traits consistent with expectations of past 
monarchs as well as those derived from newer political identities.  This reinforced the larger national 
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identity, of which the monarch was the head representative, and cemented his position as a legitimate 
medium of communication during political crises, enhancing his ability to demobilize opposition through 
promises of reform.   
 Beyond the variation in outcomes across regime type, I link the focus on social identity to a 
broader argument for increased attention among MENA scholars to the mechanisms of legitimacy in 
autocratic regimes, a factor of autocratic stability that is oft-overlooked in favor of structural and 
institutional arguments.  The increasing penetration of television and digital technologies has altered the 
political dynamic in the Middle East, such that autocrats themselves are at increased risk of being 
pushed out of power by mass protests if they allow themselves to become cast as the “villain” of the 
broader political narrative (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018).  While regime structure themselves may be 
less threatened by this newer form of opposition, it does introduce a level of instability into autocracies 
that threatens their ability to maintain their structural advantage.  Moreover, it forces autocrats 
themselves into high-risk strategies of identity construction and innovation in an attempt to shore up 
waning legitimacy, strategies that can easily backfire if it relies on less credible affective narratives.  In a 
world in which autocrats and regimes are themselves limited by the structural constraints of global 
capital - and the difficulty of regulating increasingly complex communication systems - it is clear that 
mass, digitally-mediated forms of social organization represent an increasing threat to autocrats, and by 
extension, the regimes that support them.  As such, scholars would do well to turn their focus to the 
processes that construct and motivate these mass movements: which lie largely in the behavioral, 
cognitive, and micro-foundational realm.   
 The argument proceeds as follows.  First, I make the case for a shift in focus to the behavioral 
and cognitive micro-foundations that are critical in identity formation, narrative construction, and mass 
mobilization.   By targeting a gap in the commonly used concept of legitimacy, I present the argument 
for incorporating Social Identity Theory – and its descendants – to better understand the role that these 
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micro-foundations play in strengthening or weakening autocratic regimes.  These are intertwined with 
the structural and elite-level variables that scholars tend to preference when analyzing the Middle East, 
and they have taken on even more relevance as digital media penetration has increased in MENA 
societies.  Finally, I lean on recent research in leadership behavior and identity construction to advance 
the argument that MENA monarchies – even the oil-poor – have maintained their legitimacy to a greater 
extent than their republican counterparts.  As evidence, I have included analysis of a series of fixed-
effects logistic model linking protest activity of citizens to a lack of trust in various government 
institutions, both of which are mediated by digital media usage.  This data is derived from individual-
level opinion surveys and includes 3,500 to 6,500 observations per model. I then present a qualitative, 
historical analysis targeting Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan, meant to attach a concrete narrative to 























II: Micro-foundations and the case for a shift in focus 
 
A shift from structural factors to individual level affective and cognitive processes may sound 
familiar to social movement scholars. However, for observers of the MENA region, it alters the 
established hierarchy of forces contributing to the persistence of autocratic and hybrid regimes in the 
region.  The robustness of the security apparatuses of MENA autocrats is forms the backbone of 
autocratic strength, providing a hard repressive tool capable of imposing high costs on dissidents (Bellin 
2004).  This material strength is buttressed by autocrats’ elite coalitions, funded via rent-seeking and 
manipulation of the economy, the benefits of which are often distributed via sham legislative bodies 
(Blaydes 2010). This elite-level control also ensures that civil society organizations – themselves 
requiring the investment of time and resources usually available to the social elite – are held firmly 
within the governing coalition (Yom 2005).  Mass mobilization and contentious politics from the public 
arena, then, are often relegated to tertiary importance when considering regime-level outcomes 
(regime change, leadership exit, state failure, etc.).   
Certainly, when considering the outcomes of the Arab Spring, this hierarchy makes broad sense. 
In their reprisal of Arab Spring outcomes, Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2014) noted that – 
irrespective of the size and intensity of local protests – the viability of autocrats facing discontent was 
determined by the extent to which their military and security apparatuses, as well as their elite 
coalitions, maintained their loyalty to the regime. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen - where the military and 
various elite groups abandoned the leader - the autocrat fell.  In Syria, Libya, Bahrain, Jordan, and 
Morocco - where the governing coalition held strong - autocrats persisted, absent outside intervention. 
Even in the resource poor monarchies of Jordan and Morocco – whose structural advantage is rather 
limited - the durability of these autocrats has been explained via the strategic acumen of the autocrats 




Yet, it plausible that the ultimate leverage that structural advantages afford autocrats, and the 
success of their strategies to prevent and contain contentious action, are directly tied to the attitudes of 
individuals in society.  Scholars interested in the paradox of repression have long demonstrated that the 
heavy use of security apparatuses can backfire dramatically when repressed populations respond not 
with fear, but with anger or outrage (Smithy and Kurtz 2018). This variation indicates that it is not the 
might of repressive tactics themselves that produce favorable outcomes for autocrats, but it is instead 
the emotional reactions they are able to produce; emotions that are tied to the affective orientations 
and cognitive processes of the population.  Similarly, elites are assumed to be relatively instrumental in 
their dedication to a given leader (Svolik 2010). When confronted, therefore, with intense and seemingly 
enraged opposition from society (not the type to respond favorably to repression), it is less likely that 
they are going to stick by their dictator, especially if their own fate is not tied to his.  We saw this 
dynamic play out spectacularly in Egypt when, seeing that Mubarak’s security forces would be unable to 
contain protestors on the famous “Day of Rage”, the military moved to intervene, and soon offered 
Mubarak to the people after dissociating themselves from him.   
In addition, the efficacy of strategic moves (highly selective repression, the superficial offer of 
reforms amidst contentious periods that seemed to quiet protests in Jordan and Morocco were 
undergirded by a presumed credibility of the autocrat; credibility stemming from some measure of trust 
in his ability (Yom 2013; Benchesmi 2012).  Indeed, similar reform offers in Egypt and Tunisia (and more 
recently in democratic states such as Lebanon or Iraq) were rejected soundly, serving only to further 
enrage protestors. Simply put, the structural and institutional inputs help set the stage of contentious 
politics, and provide autocrats with tools of maintaining power.  It is the attitudes of the people, 




Yet, this is not to say that micro-foundations operate in a vacuum. The changing structures of 
communications technologies – along with the constraints imposed by global capitalism – have 
weakened the structural advantages that autocrats hold over their societies, and have allowed for the 
formation of oppositional frames that my otherwise have struggled to propagate across the loosely 
organized and diverse ideological societies of the MENA region.  Indeed, the Islamist and the educated 
liberal have little to agree on in terms of the political society they envision for the future.  They were, 
however, allied by their mutual distrust and anger toward the institutions of government, and the 
significant diversity of their coalition was hidden by the variety of digital platforms available.  
In other words, the emotional and cognitive processes that encourage an individual’s decision to 
protest are socially mediated, rather than generated solely in the individual mind, and while there are a 
few studies that have examined emotional and cognitive triggers of contentious politics in MENA, they 
tend to remain rather isolated to their effects at the individual level, rather than drawing in the social 
processes involving the formation and spread of political communities that help define individualized 
perceptions.  Indeed, the most recent psychological and sociological literature points to affective 
orientations, reflex emotions, and cognitive distortions as products of social and political environment of 
an individual (Jasper 2018). Their affective responses to regime leaders, the urgency of political crises, 
the specific, targeted causes of economic stagnation, are all drawn to some extent by the prevailing 
perspective of an individual’s community.  Micro-foundational research in MENA often references broad 
emotional moods or generalized perceptions that drive an individual’s decision-making, but it can be 
vague about the processes that contribute to the development of these generalized emotional or 
cognitive climes.  Part of the contribution of this study is to draw in recent work from the field of 
communications that describes the process of forming broad political communities in the digital era, 
thus providing a link between the structural factors that place stress on MENA societies and their 
affective and cognitive reactions to these stressors.  The necessary formation of physical social networks 
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(CSOs, religious organizations, etc.) that help build and fuel opposition is short-circuited to some extent 
by the ability of digital networks to draw masses of individual into a broad movement, setting the stage 
for the emotional and identity work necessary to motivate dangerous protest action in the region.  
However, if some structural alterations were necessary conditions in breathing life into the 
streets of the Arab world, the narratives employed to motivate protest participation, and the emotional 
and cognitive landscape that they fell upon, were the sufficient factors in producing mass movements 
broad enough to threaten historically stable autocrats.  This role highlights the methods by which 
autocratic regimes legitimate themselves, and the expectations they create when doing so.  In order to 
obtain legitimacy, a regime must legitimate itself, a process that breaks down into two components, 
supply and demand (Haldenwang 2017).  They describe the interplay between the “right to rule” (Gilley 
2009, Haldenwang 2017) of governments, and the right to dissent within society (Rawls 2005, 
Haldenwang 2017).  On the supply side, governments put forward a legitimacy claim, one that – to be 
successful – must either conform to or causally alter the behavioral and affective orientations of the 
populace.  On the demand side, populations ask for performance in bettering the common good, that 
concept itself defined by the expectations constructed by political leadership, as well as the political and 
cultural history of a given state (Haldenwang 2017).   
Historically, the concept of legitimacy has been difficult to grasp or explain, even for scholars 
whose research focuses on it.  I do not claim to offer much in terms of a more concrete explanation – 
largely due to the paucity of targeted data available for the concept in the MENA region – but research 
in psychology and sociology have given us better tools to discuss how legitimacy is formed, as well as its 
component parts.  In particular, it targets the necessity of building and maintaining a broad social 
identity that sets common expectations of in-group members and leadership, as well as the components 
necessary for building that identity, and the way in which they can operate upon certain cognitive and 
emotional cues common in a population.  These psycho-social processes are linked not only to the 
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structure of digital media, but also to the behavior of autocratic leaders and the critical role it plays in 
the structure of social identity in a given state.  How the autocrat is evaluated - and the affective 
response he produces in the general population - depend in a large part upon the consistency of his 
behavior and record with previously generated expectations of the leader’s role in politics and society. 
Past choices about the autocrat’s personal political status, institutional power, and governing coalition 
produce affective structures that color the perceptions of the general citizenry.  Autocrats that fail to 
reinforce these expectations, or act contrary to them, risk destabilizing broad behavioral patterns that 
reinforce their rule.  In addition, this argument will specifically target the differing legitimation patterns 
of monarchs and the leaders of republics, wherein the former leader type benefitted from historically 
stable identity structures, and worked within those structures to maintain their legitimate authority.  
The latter inherited large-scale nationalist projects that were inherently unstable, and rather than 
attempt to reconstitute a modern national identity under their authority, instead turned toward 
securitization and division to maintain autocratic control. While this strategy proved stable for some 
time, it sowed the seeds for widespread opposition frames that placed the autocrat as the sole target 
for previously diverse, disconnected opposition groups. 
Taken together, this argument calls for a greater appreciation of the individual-level attitudes 
that contribute to large-scale structural outcomes in the MENA region, and for a greater attention the 
multi-faceted nature of power (see, Lukes 2004).  Autocrats in MENA have competed – and dominated – 
at the structural and institutional level for decades.  Yet, many have ignored the plane upon which 
identity and behavioral factors operate.  As the next section will argue, the rise of the internet and 
increasing digital media usage provided opposition movements with new, identity-driven tools to 
motivate protestors, enough to at least destabilize regimes structures and push widely hated autocrats 




III: Digital media, new organizing forms and principles 
 Key to the premises of this analysis is the assertion that 1) autocrats are in a moderately weaker 
structural position than they have been in the past, and 2) that the ultimate fate of autocrats depends 
more heavily on the processes of identity formation and the resonance of oppositional narrative, 
particularly the position of the autocrat in that narrative. These assertions are made credible by the 
alterations in communications environment of the region, beginning with the rise of disruptive 
televisions networks, such as Al-Jazeera, and culminating in the increased usage of social media sites to 
mediate protests and foster opposition identities.  This section covers the role of digital media in 
drawing masses into protest movements.  The loose “networks of outrage and hope” (Castells 2015) 
that have formed emotionally charged digital communities are crucial to providing a platform for 
opposition movements to form.  These communities then operate to pull individuals into broad protest 
movements by relying on moral narratives, heuristics, and personalized protest frames that can obscure 
participant diversity that might otherwise short-circuit mass action.  While these processes do not 
necessarily depend upon mass adoption of social media, or mass television viewing, it is evidence that 
these technologies act as meeting points or binding agents between disparate physical communities, 
and that it draws in and empowers previously unassociated individuals over and above those who might 
be active in political organizations.  Additionally, these mechanisms are more powerful when the 
identity structures that have traditionally been utilized in the nation-building projects of the region have 
weakened, leaving citizens searching for other attachments, and weakening the ability of the autocrat to 
control his position in new identity structures.  Finally, I present the results of a quantitative analysis of 
opinion polling in the MENA region, demonstrating that digital media usage was a strong determinant of 
protest attendance, and that attitudes related to distrust in government institutions – often a measure 
of legitimacy - were more consistent predictors of protest participation than with those related to 
economic or security conditions.  
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The idea that political communities are able to transmit and frame the type of information that 
might destabilize autocracies is certainly not new, and that fact is reflected in the numerous references 
in recent research to burgeoning “Pan-Arab identities” (Yom and Gause III 2012), the newly activated 
“Arab Street” (Bayat 2017; Eickelman 2003), and in particular, a rise in digitally-mediated communities 
that serve to replace traditional civil society organizations capable of organizing contentious action and 
destabilizing regimes (Beissinger 2015, Lawson 2015, Khraidy 2016). These communities not only reveal 
and connect disparate discontented individuals, but provide the language, symbols, affective 
orientations, and emotional cues that help us to interpret our everyday reality.  As such, they are natural 
foci for research seeking to understand the interplay between micro-foundations and macro-trends.  
Yet, current research targeting cognitive or emotional factors in mass protests – particularly in 
the MENA region – often elide the causal role of digital media in activating and sharpening these factors.  
The two most prominent analyses of the micro-foundations of the Arab Spring protests target cognitive 
heuristics and motivated reasoning. Weyland (2012) is the prime example of the former, though others 
have made similar analyses (Hale 2013; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2013).  This perspective relies 
on the contributions to the field of psychology made by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), who 
introduced prospect theory to the social sciences.  It argues that individuals who perceive themselves to 
be in the “domain of losses” - seeing their likely future social circumstances as less palatable than the 
present – are more likely to take risks in order to prevent those losses, and to make decisions based on 
heuristic shortcuts and faulty information.  Weyland argues that both the citizens of Tunisia and those 
who participated in the cascade of uprisings around the region had perceived themselves to be in the 
domain of losses for some time, particularly following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.  Thus, when 
faced with the stunning images of dissent, they quickly calculated that they could mount similar 
challenges in their own settings, without considering differences of conditions. In sum, the decisions of 
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protestors in the Arab Spring were boundedly rational (Jones 1999), which explains the diverse and 
inexperienced make-up, as well as the quick dissolution, once the reality of their limited power set in.   
Pearlman (2013) is an example of the argument targeting motivated reasoning, which 
incorporates recent findings from neuroscience and the influence of emotions.  She draws a distinction 
between emotions that are essentially disabling (i.e. fear or shame) and those that are empowering (i.e. 
hope or indignation), arguing that under social conditions in which disabling emotions are the norm, 
contentious action in opposition to the regime are highly unlikely.  Conversely, as the emotional climate 
shifts toward empowering emotions, then individuals might be mobilized for mass action, despite the 
potential costs associated with it.  Pearlman goes on to argue that the emotional climate of the Middle 
East had been changing over time, and that with self-immolation of Bouazizi was a trigger that 
cemented the presence of empowering emotions and downplayed the traditionally dominant emotions 
of fear and shame; this climate then quickly dispersed throughout the region via social media.  Under 
this perspective, individual citizens always had the incentive and the motivation to organize but needed 
a change in the emotional climate to change their calculations of instrumentality. 
 There is evidence for both of these processes operating during and following the Arab Spring.  
Importantly, however, both perspectives locate the conditions driving decision-making processes 
outside of the digital world, with new media acting solely as a conduit for the triggers associated with 
either emotional climates or prospective evaluations.  Yet, triggers for action exist in everyday society, 
and are often not acted upon.  Individuals are made aware from protests from friends, family, or 
physical proximity, yet do not join.  Self-immolation as a form of protest, for example, had been used 
previously in the region (Khraidy 2016).  What is it about the transmission of images and information 
over the internet – or alternatively through mass television – that makes triggers more effective than 
those in everyday society?  
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In the field of political science, there is limited recourse in responding to the above question. By 
a fair distance, Marc Lynch remains one of the elite scholars most committed to describing and 
analyzing the slowly forming political communities across the region, the majority of the time with a 
focus on the media that facilitate this formation.  In Voices of the New Arab Public (2006), Lynch makes a 
pre-Arab-uprising argument about the impact of new media on the disruption of a monolithic public 
sphere, one traditionally characterized by social and political quiescence, as well as an explicit devotion 
to the autocrat (Wedeen 2015).  Cultivating dissenting voices on televisions networks and internet 
platforms, Lynch argues, disrupts the presumption of both outside observers and Arab citizens 
themselves that the public is tied strongly to the autocrat; or at least, that they are sufficiently cowed by 
the autocrat’s intimidation tactics.  In many ways, the argument mirrors the events of the uprising in the 
eyes of Middle East observers.  The Arab public was presumed quiescent, until new media sources 
revealed otherwise; similarly, the foundations of Arab autocracy were presumed sound, until the 
uprisings revealed otherwise.  While it is notable that the uprisings did little to thoroughly topple 
regimes across the region, it certainly shook the foundations of autocratic stability.  Yet, despite Lynch’s 
work - as well as the post-uprising work of others analyzing the role of the internet and television in 
fostering discontent (i.e. Tufecki and Wilson 2014) – there remains limited specific theorizing on how 
these communities are formed, how widespread they become, and the conditions under which they 
produce frames strong enough to motivate widespread contentious action.   
 Part of the answer to how these communities form and spread lies in the dual-processing 
theories of cognitive psychology and its relation to the structured information environment of the 
internet and television.  Dual-process theory has been developing in the field of psychology for some 
time, but perhaps the first clear proposal of the theory lies with Jonathan Evans (see Evans 2008 for 
review).  It claims that humans – conditional on their surrounding environment – process information by 
two methods.  Type I processing is considered automatic, fast, and bias-driven, whereas Type II 
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processing is considered, long-term, and (relatively) objective (Smith and DeCoster 2000).  Though dual-
processing theories exist in a number of forms throughout various fields of psychology, the common 
model asserts that when presented with new information, individuals will rely primarily upon Type I 
processing, drawing from their previous experiences – and assorted biases – to make automatic 
decisions; that is, unless they are afforded the time or external stimuli to work slower, and allow more 
reasoned Type II processing to take over (Evans and Stanovich 2013).  In situations where a subject is 
inexperienced, Type I processing often leads to poor decision-making outcomes, as the individual has 
limited default memory to rely on when processing new information (Smith and DeCoster 2000). Type I 
processing is thought to occur more frequently in both saturated and fast information environments, in 
which individuals’ ability to actually process all the information available to them is limited, and they 
therefore default to shorter heuristic decision-processes (Ibid).   
 Not surprisingly recent literature from psychology and neurosciences have begun to associate 
Type I processing with internet, social media usage, and television usage (Bandura 2009).  In the case of 
internet platforms association derives from three characteristics, in addition to its assumed status as a 
saturated information environment.  First, the profit model of internet platforms relies on advertising 
and dissemination, encouraging users to click through pages as quickly as possible in order to enhance 
the viewership of as many advertisers and digital content providers as possible (Walther, Gay, and 
Hancock 2005).  Second, again driven by the profit model of online businesses, the structure of the 
internet information flow is inherently associative, meaning that connections are formed 
preconsciously, based on similarities with previous patterns of behavior, without much structure relying 
on language, logic, or culturally-invested symbols (Harris and Sanborn 2013, pg 18; Smith and DeCoster 
2000).  As platforms gather data points, they feed information to the user based on simple similarities, 
but algorithms have little understanding of the meaning of various data points, pursuing pattern 
completion rather than underlying meanings.  Thus, as an individual spends more time online, their 
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previous behaviors and biases are reinforced by the information connections generated by the various 
platforms on which they operate.  Third, and related, the focus on pattern completion – in addition to 
the autonomous control that internet users have over the content that they engage with – means that 
disconfirming or intervening information that might trigger a pause in the quicker, Type I processing 
patterns of individuals is largely absent (Farrell 2012).  Scholars of dual-processing theory contend that 
individuals tend to default to Type I processing patterns unless there is sufficient time or stimuli 
provided to encourage slower, reasoned thinking (Turel et. al 2014).  
 Importantly, the above effects are distinct features of internet platforms, rather than traditional 
television.  While much early identity work was driven by the rise of disruptive platforms such as Al-
Jazeera (Lynch 2005), its structure limits the ultimate impact that it has in motivating participation.  Not 
only is there less information contained in a television screen – relative to the complex screens of 
internet platforms – but it lacks the interactivity aspect that both motivates participation by the subject 
and provides information to the platform such that it can adapt to user preferences (Harris and Sanborn 
2013).  Additionally, television programming lacks the democratic control and anonymity available to 
social media sites, especially in autocratic states (Atton 2015), and therefore oppositional frames are 
more difficult to develop from the grassroots level.  Thus, while television might play a role in spreading 
or amplifying opposition messaging, it is doubtful that it can serve as usefully in creating that messaging, 
or motivating community formation in the same manner. 
 This suggests that – regardless of the socially-derived motivations for protest – information 
transmitted over, or refracted through, the internet is likely to encounter individuals more susceptible 
to quick, impulsive action than those mobilized via other networks (organizational, community, etc.).  In 
fact, one study of the neural pathways activated while engaged on social media concluded that the 
centers of the brain related to impulsive, preconscious decision making were strongly activated, 
whereas the areas related to slower, conscious thinking were largely dormant (ibid).  Thus, whether an 
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individual was concerned over their future prospects – or emotionally empowered by anger or 
indignation – the transmission of information over new media sources seems to encourage individuals 
to rely on those pre-formed states, rather than activating slower, cautious reasoning processes.  In that 
sense, the medium of information transmission acts as important intervening variable drawing actors 
that might otherwise had been traditionally difficult to mobilize – despite the clear presence of 
grievances – into mass protest. 
 Some observational and experimental evidence exists to support the idea that internet 
dissemination produced behavioral reactions that responded quicker than those mobilized by other 
means.  In Tunisia, the geographical pattern of the spread of initial anti-regime protests from Sidi Bouzid 
– deep in the hinterland – directly to middle-class university graduates in the capitol city stands as one 
such example. Instead of spreading through traditional geographical, labor, and religious networks 
embedded in Tunisia’s heartland, the protests jumped quickly to the unemployed graduates in Tunis, 
individuals who have little in common with an informal fruit vendor in Sidi Bouzid other than a basic 
frustration with the regime.  Labor unions and religious networks were far slower to join the fray, and 
required significant demonstration effects - in the form of mass protests in the capitol - prior to 
participating (Bradley 2012).  Similar patterns were observed in Egypt, where participation in the first 
day of protests was most strongly and robustly correlated with discovering about them via Facebook 
(Tufekci and Wilson 2012).  This matches the narrative of most observers of the protests in Tahrir, where 
numerous scholars noted the initial participation of seemingly unaffiliated individuals, with Islamist and 
labor groups joining only later.   
 Implied in the above paragraph is the binding role played by digital media, particularly on social 
media platforms. This role is key to constructing broad identities capable of drawing in the masses to 
protest movements, building on the previous identity-construction processes of print media and 
televisions (Anderson 1983). The essential difference, according to recent work in communications 
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technology, is the personalized action frames constructed on internet platforms, facilitated by the 
anatomy of digital platforms, and providing for the formation of a loose, imagined community capable 
of drawing in diverse groups of actors.  Following the recent surge in digitally-mediated, mass protest 
movements across the globe, Bennett and Segerberg (2013) proposed a new theory for understanding 
digital community formation amidst the waning influence of traditional civil society organizations 
worldwide.  Coining the phrase connective action, Bennett and Segerberg (2013) argue that these more 
individualized citizens of the modern era - as opposed to socialized through traditional networks – are 
conditioned to look for more personalized reasons to associate with larger groups, pathways that 
accommodate a wide variety of social backgrounds and preferences (pg 6).  The internet is uniquely 
suited to provide these frames due to its ability to host large, diverse communities while simultaneously 
filtering noisy information not relevant to the individual participant (ibid).  An activist may be able to 
create a relatively general frame, such as “We Are all Khalid Said” or “We are the 99%” and allow the 
filtering and self-selection processes of internet platforms to connect individuals to posts and to 
potential compatriots that share similar goals, while simultaneously obscuring the true diversity of the 
community.  This allows for the participation of mass, diverse groups of people along highly personalized 
lines, while eliminating the chaos associated with horizontal networks in the physical world.  By this 
process, individuals who have previously eschewed organizational affiliations can begin to identify with 
a larger, though unreal community.  
 However, while simultaneously providing the scaffolding for mass community connections, 
digital media also carries with it an intense interactivity component, again a feature that is vital to 
drawing in and binding diverse participants.  Designed in part to provide more data points for platform 
administrators and advertising algorithms, most internet platforms – whether social or news media – 
have installed a complex system of social feedback mechanisms encouraging individuals to 1) create 
performances in the form of pictures, videos, and testimonials that signal their membership in an online 
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community and 2) affirm the performances of others in a mutually reinforcing recognition process 
(Harris and Sanborn 2013). As platforms continue to attract participants and generate connections 
between them, it provides for an incredibly large pool of potential rewards for individuals performing 
their membership in a given online community often fostering an attachment to the immediacy and 
loose conditionality of that rewards system (Przybylski et. al 2013). 
 In addition to the role that online platforms play in drawing individuals into diverse 
communities, they also play a role in activating or sharpening psychological conditions that might draw 
protestors into movements.  The create far more connections than any one person can reasonably 
engage with, fostering a recently-named phenomenon: “Fear of Missing Out” (see ibid.).  Though FOMO 
has only become a subject for study in the last few years, numerous empirical works have drawn a 
strong connection between it and social media use (ibid; Elhai et al 2016; Royal Society for Public Health 
2017).  It is described as an anxiety that others may be having rewarding experiences that an individual 
is missing out on and is driven by the proliferation of individual performances found in online 
community.  Importantly, FOMO is thought to be linked to low needs satisfaction in an individual’s life 
(Ellison, Steinfield, C. and Lampe 2007; Przybylski et. al 2013). What this anxiety encourages, therefore, 
is constant attention to – and participation in – online communities, often to the exclusion of physically 
proximate social networks (Harris and Sanborn 2015).   
 Though the study of FOMO has not been a priority in the Arab world, nor in connection with the 
Arab Spring, there seems to be some evidence of its presence. Social media is widely recognized as a 
social outlet for isolated individuals in autocratic and culturally restrictive states, providing a means for 
expressing oneself and finding others who might not fit the politically and culturally proscribed lifestyles 
of a given society, and there seems to be evidence that those who contributed most to the protest 
participation were peripheral network members (Steinert-Threlkeld 2017; Bennet, Segerberg, and Yan 
2018).  However, specific studies linking FOMO to internet usage or to participation in Arab Spring 
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protests have yet to be conducted.  Certainly, the influence of FOMO as a mechanism drawing 
individuals into online communities, and encouraging active maintenance and participation, would help 
to explain the sheer volume of previously unaffiliated individuals drawn into mass protests.  If, as is 
hypothesized by researchers, FOMO indeed inspires participation in online communities, then there is 
reason to believe that it would also inspire individuals to attend protests, as photos and testimonials 
from there time there would be a key mode of demonstrating participation online.  There is certainly a 
tentatively established connection between the visibility of decisions made in online networks that 
motivation physical attendance at protest events (Steinert-Threlkeld 2017; Larson et al 2016). In any 
case, further research on the connections between FOMO, internet usage, and the dynamics of 
movement participation is likely warranted.  
 Beyond their structural effects, internet platforms also provide content that contributes to the 
formation of oppositional narratives that motivate action.  Scholars of political behavior have long 
thought that a key part of motivating individuals to participate in politics -whether by voting or 
contentious actions – is the construction of a moral narrative (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009), 
wherein the issues at stake activate deep, black-and-white beliefs about how the world should be.  It is 
these narratives that raise the stakes for non-participation, and soften the costs of risky action (Jasper 
2018). Triggering strongly felt affective structures in this way helps to motivate action in the defense of 
these structures, a basic behavioral mechanism that ensures the world remains legible to the individual 
(see Robinson et. al 2006). 
Yet, unifying diverse opposition groups around a single moral narrative can often be quite 
difficult, especially if the conversation remains limited to abstract concepts.  The aforementioned 
personalized structure of digital media platforms helps to overcome that obstacle to some extent, but 
recently social movement scholars have begun to focus more seriously on character work within these 
narratives.  Characters – they argue – are essential in providing legibility to narratives (Jasper, Young, 
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and Zuern 2018). Various characters carry with them cultural and symbolic meanings that help 
communicate intended emotions to observers, and to encourage the processes of common 
identification that operate along visual lines (Whittier 2001).   
In particular, social movement scholars tend to focus on the “essential triad” of characters in 
any moral narrative; the villain, the victim, and the hero (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018).  While various 
societies have specific social roles that they assign to each category, they tend to be defined commonly 
along three dimensions.  Is the subject good or bad?  Is the subject powerful or weak? Is the subject 
active or passive?  According to this theory – derived from Affect Control Theory in psychology – heroes 
tend to be good, powerful, and variably active (generally passive until threatened by a villain); villains 
tend to be bad, powerful, and consistently active (representing at threat); victims tend to be good, 
weak, and passive (motivating their defense on the part of the hero) (Bergstrand and Jasper 2018).  The 
credible assignment of these character roles to figures within the political sphere can work to motivate 
action on behalf of victims, against the villains, in which the participants themselves become the heroes. 
The ability of digital media platforms to quickly disseminate images of victims and identify villains, and 
encouraging diverse groups to identity with – or against, in the case of villains – these characters, is a 
critical part of forming opposition movements in the digital sphere. 
Despite differing roles, heroes and victims are often seen as mirror images of each other.  Both 
are powerful, and both are active participants in the political sphere.  The critical difference between 
them is whether they have a positive or negative affective attachment to the citizenry.  An autocrat’s 
identity work can be a distinguishing factor in whether they are viewed generally positively or negatively 
in the eyes of the population.  If a negative affect becomes too widespread, then the autocrat has 
readily provided opposition movements with an easily identifiable – and recognized – villain for their 
narratives.  Similarly, the actions of the autocrat in the political sphere can help to shift the balance in 
one direction or another.  Heroes are more admired when they are seen as generally passive, becoming 
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active only in response to threats to victims (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018).  For example, the 
monarchs of Jordan and Morocco both place themselves as formally above electoral politics, generally 
outside of the political fray until their influence is needed (Clark 2018).  A heavily securitized republican 
state on the other hand, where security forces linked to the autocrat are active in their repressive roles, 
can lead to an increased perception of needless – and perhaps villainous – activity on behalf of the 
autocrat.  With the digital media able to disseminate and activate images that characterize actors in the 
political sphere, it is crucial that the autocrat is attentive to the credibility of his image as a villain, and 
the way in which is own actions help contribute to the overarching narrative.   
 Both autocratic and democratic governments would likely be concerned about protest dynamics 
that are effective in drawing masses into contentious action, but these dynamics are particularly sharp 
in autocratic states for a few reasons.  The first of these has already been stated, that digital media fills a 
crucial organizing gap in autocratic societies where associational life is both heavily controlled and 
broadly discouraged.  This therefore represents a greater shift in the power balance between the regime 
and mass society, one that is likely smaller than in mature democracies with more robust civil society 
organizations.  However, the second is the underlying social conditions that tend to occur more often in 
autocratic societies, and especially those of the Middle East.  Most of the studies covered above 
recognize the independent causal power produced by the design effects of digital media, but also imply 
an interaction between those effects and emotional states such as anxiety and isolation.  Those working 
with social identity in particular have drawn strong connections between online communities and a 
need to belong that is not fulfilled in physical networks (Duman and Ozkara 2019; Turkle 2011).  Simply 
put, it seems that societies with a poor associational life, limited freedoms, and national identification 
would experience the pull effects of digital media more strongly.  
 It is worth noting here that a hallmark of the robust authoritarian states of the MENA region is 
the suppression of associational life and the depoliticization of the populace, often at the expense of the 
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more active nation-building projects that characterized the early independence periods (Anderson 
1991). The nationalist leaders of that era (Bourguiba, Nasser, etc.) were able to effectively mobilize their 
citizenry around a new national project.  Yet, the stagnation of these projects in the subsequent years, 
combined with the death of the most of the original nationalists, threatened the stability of these 
regimes.  Dangerous new identity models – particularly that of Political Islamists - then prompted a shift 
by most states toward demobilization and securitization of the populace, as well as a disruption of 
associational life (Bellin 2004).  While this shift was felt most strongly in the previously nationalist 
republics it characterized the experiences of many if not most states in the region.  It represented a 
general ceding of the field in the plane of competition for the hearts and minds of Arab citizens.  Of 
course, Islamist organizations are still relatively strong in the MENA region, and have been for decades. 
However, over the years they have tended to find various settlements with autocrats, such that they 
might continue to operate without the threat of regime overthrow (Wagemakers 2016; LaCroix 2016).  
These groups rediscovered their oppositional power in during the Arab Spring, but not uniformly, and 
only after the demonstration effects provided by the unaffiliated masses.   
In some ways, the instability in the early Islamist period operated via similar identity processes 
as that of the Arab Spring, yet without the digital media, the effect was siloed among those connected 
to those organizations, and the alternative provided by Islamists failed to inspire wider society. The 
introduction of widespread digital media, in particular online platforms, provided the scaffolding and 
content for a broad opposition movement that was inclusive of diverse groups, a phenomenon that has 
already produced instability for autocrats of the region, and will likely continue to do so in the 
foreseeable future (Beissinger 2017).  
While the next section will cover in more detail the fundamentals of social identity theory, and 
the role that autocrats play in suppressing or encouraging opposition movements, I first examine the 
claims made above from a quantitative perspective.  There exists limited data sufficient for gaining 
23 
 
causal leverage on these questions, but given the theoretical underpinnings, correlation is likely a 
sufficient indicator.  In the beginning of this section, I provided two assertions underpin the relevance of 
digital media.  First, that autocrats are in structurally weaker positions than previously, and second, that 
the mediated nature of the Arab Spring protests foregrounded behavioral and identity-driven 
motivations.  The corroborate the first assertion, I present evidence here that protest attendance is 
linked to increasing digital media usage in the political sphere.  As stated previously, the ability of 
digitally-mediated movements to motivate mass protest – in organizationally weak environments and in 
the face of extensive security forces – helps to balance the dominance autocrats have enjoyed in the 
institutional and economic sphere.  It renders their security forces less effective and gives elites 
significant incentive to abandon the autocrat.  To back the second assertion, I present evidence that 
trust in various government institutions – a common measure of legitimacy – was significantly 
correlated with protest attendance.  Autocrats who find themselves identified as an out-group member 
– perhaps a villainous strongman or a cancer in the ranks of power – they are likely to be considered 
illegitimate, and not to be trusted.  If potential protestors can be motivated by a lack of legitimacy, a 
lack of trust, then it represents a significant threat to autocratic power. 
 In terms of operationalizing our concepts, case selection, and method of analysis, the Arab 
Barometer provides the most extensive ranged of public opinion data, with the largest sample sizes in 
the region.  Yet, despite its superiority to other data sources, there exist significant roadblocks for causal 
analysis, as well as large amounts of missing data from various waves.  For example, a key part of 
identifying shifts in legitimacy or digital media usage over time is the ability to view data from prior to 
the outbreak of Arab Spring protests in late 2010/2011.  Yet, the Arab Barometer’s first wave (taken in 
2007) provides little leverage in terms of questions targeted at trust, and more importantly, omits key 
cases from its data (cases such as Egypt and Tunisia, two prominent Arab Spring countries).  Similarly, 
cases are omitted in future waves as well.  For example, data on Morocco is missing from wave 2 (taken 
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in 2011), and Bahrain is omitted entirely from post-Arab Spring analyses.  Because of these gaps, 
correlation is the only real bar that we can clear with this quantitative analysis, and I am limited in 
options for operationalizing concepts.   
 Choosing cases present similar obstacles, for similar reason.  Data collection is relatively 
inconsistent across time points, especially for those countries that experienced significant state 
disruption or failure in the wake of the Arab Spring.  This is an important barrier, because my analysis 
calls for states that experienced direct protests but continued to collect public opinion data throughout 
the period of the uprisings.  States that experienced little or no protests – such as the oil-rich states of 
the Gulf – offer little in terms of leverage, as these are states in which the structural conditions favoring 
autocracy have not changed as dramatically as in resource-poor states.  Similarly, while part of the 
project is comparative at the state level – contrasting the experiences of varying regime types – a key 
aspect of the assertions above concern individual-level motivations. Monarchies experienced less 
intense challenges to their regimes, but they were certainly not immune to the discontent that swept 
the region.  As such, my sample needs states with high levels of individual level variation in contentious 
action.  Finally, while it might be useful to expand cases by including countries that recently came to 
resemble those of the Arab spring – namely Algeria and Sudan – all present data collection occurred 
significantly before protests broke out in either state.  I am therefore left with the following four cases 
for analysis: Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco.  These four states have consistent data collection 
across three Arab Barometer Waves (2013, 2016, and 2019), and provide sufficient variation at the 
individual and state level to provide useful comparison.  They also fall within the range of medium-
income countries, with limited resource endowments. While they do have significant variation in 
population size, and security alliances, these are of limited relevance to my hypotheses.   
 I have constructed six logistic regression models with fixed-country effects and a suite of 
demographic controls.  This model-type allows for state level comparisons due to the fixed effects, as 
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well as a broad analysis of individual motivations across states.  In the first three of the models, I test the 
assertion that participation in contentious politics is related to media usage.  Appendix A includes a 
broader description of the variable used in the analysis, as well as a list of the various demographic 
controls used.  The dependent variable here is attendance at a sit-in, demonstration, or protest, a binary 
variable (hence the logistic regression model).  For covariates, I test various media inputs, including 
regular internet, social media, and television usage, as well as more targeted variables, such as “using 
the internet to follow political news,” or “using the internet to express political opinions.”  Using various 
measures helps to find some nuance in the broader story about the precise pathways by which media 
usage leads to protest participation.  These variables are tested with more traditionally-understood 
vehicle of protest participation, namely membership in civil-society organizations or political parties.    
 The results from Table 1 below show the outcome of my logistic regression from three waves of 
Arab Barometer data.  As the reader can see, broad internet usage is significantly and positively 
correlated with protest attendance, as is using the internet to express political opinions.  Wave 5 in 
particular makes the case that social media is critical to the process of forming opposition identities and 
motivating protest.  This is the first wave that targeted social media usage as separate from internet 
usage, and it found that internet usage alone was insignificant – unlike Wave 3 and 4 – but that 
increasing social media usage is strongly correlated with protest attendance.  Importantly, television 
usage was inconsistently correlated with protest attendance, with significance in Wave 5 only.  This 
provide some evidence to  corroborate an earlier claim that television may act as an amplifier of 
oppositional frames (as was the case with Al Jazeera) but that much of the independent work is done on 
the internet, where users have more interactive experiences with their communities, and state 
institutions exercise less control. Together, these results provide some quantitative evidence to back the 





Correlation of Media Usage and Protest Participation 
 Dependent variable: 
 Attendance 
 (Wave 3) (Wave 4) (Wave 5) 
Use Internet for Pol. News 0.226 0.253* 0.115 
 (.180) (.148) (.371) 
Use Internet to Express Pol. Opinions 0.459*** 0.647*** NA 
 (.174) (.154)  
Internet Usage (frequency) -.117** -.097** .064 
 (.050) (.041) (.050) 
Social Media Usage (frequency) NA NA .173** 
   (048) 
Television Usage (frequency) -0.079 -0.061 .136** 
 (.075) (.046) (.050) 
Membership in CSO .631*** 1.24*** 1.09*** 
 (.146) (.135) (.087) 
Membership in Pol. Party 0.780** 1.01** NA 
 (.253) (.329)  
Jordan -2.36*** -1.58*** -1.04*** 
 (.183) (.165) (.112) 
Morocco -1.01*** .136 .876*** 
 (.220) (.137) (.116) 
Egypt -0.368*** -1.70*** -.131 
 (.147) (.182) (.112) 
Tunisia NA NA NA 
    
Constant 1.168** 0.486 1.134*** 
 (0.493) (0.477) (0.371) 
Observations 4,330 4,319 5,203 
Log Likelihood -1,059.045 -1,261.282 -2,367.123 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,156.090 2,560.564 4,768.245 




Importantly, more traditional organizations such as political parties and CSOs were also strongly 
correlated, with large coefficients.  This is an expected result, as these organizations can still offer 
experience and resources that can be useful for contentious action.  However, the scale differences on 
the variables – combined with the widespread penetration of social media – reveals the increasing 
power of digital media.  Organizational and party membership are binary variables, whereas the 
measures for internet and social media usage are ordinal variables with 5 values.   The change in 
predicted probability of protest attendance when an individual moves from no internet/social media 
usage to the daily usage in Wave 3 of our results is .023, compared with the change in the probability of 
attendance when moving from no affiliation to affiliation with a CSO (.035) or political party (.051).  The 
change in probabilities are more comparable when adjusting for the full-scale shift.  In addition, across 
our cases, an average of 5.4% of the citizenry reported membership in an official organization, whereas 
an average of 20% reported using the internet or social media at least once or twice daily, far 
outweighing the remaining differences in predicted probabilities.  Notably, the discrepancy between 
these effects is smaller in Wave 4 and Wave 5 analyses of the Arab Barometer, with organizational 
membership increasing among the population, and taking a greater role in motivating protest 
attendance.  This suggests that the Arab Spring protests of 2011 leaned heavily on digital media in an 
organizationally scarce environment, but then may have offered a useful pathway for newly formed 
CSOs and political parties to recruit mobilized citizens. 
There are a few other points to note about the data above.  First, many of the theorized 
demographic covariates that are thought to be linked to protest attendance – not reported in Table 1 
but included in Appendix A – were not significantly correlated, or weakly correlated.  The narrative of 
unemployed students, low-income citizens, and religious organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
being large drivers of protest activity seems only weakly supported.  Education was significantly related 
to protest attendance, but income was not, nor was status as an unemployed individual, nor religiosity.  
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These provide some underlying evidence that suggest methods of mobilization are arguably more 
important determinants of action than suspected underlying motivations.   
 Additionally, the correlation of the country fixed effect indicators provides some evidence for 
the broad claim about the reduced protest activity in monarchies, as well as some qualifications 
regarding the effects of leader choice and changes in leadership over time.  In the fixed effects model, 
Tunisia was taken as the baseline country, and it displayed the most protest activity in Wave 3 (2013) 
relative to the other states, with Egypt close behind.  Jordan and Morocco, on the other hand, were 
significantly less likely to see protests than either Egypt or Tunisia, reflecting the understanding of the 
region at the time, with Egypt and Tunisia rocked by turmoil, and Morocco and Jordan experiencing less 
dissent.  However, by Wave 4 (2016), this trend had reversed, and Morocco in particular showed a 
greater tendency to protest when compared with other states, with Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan seeing 
less protest.  This reversal shows comes during a time when the Moroccan monarchy was heavily 
criticized for involving itself too heavily in party politics, and following a wave of protests after security 
forces in the north of the country killed a fishmonger, an unusual occurrence for the country, and one 
that sparked significant protests against the security forces. Importantly, those protests did not target 
the monarch, however, and in fact were often cast as an entreaty to Mohammad VI to exercise more 
control over the security forces. This period will be covered in more depth in the case studies, but it 
suggests that monarchies are not immune to protests if they behave poorly, but again, their baseline 
legitimacy can help them navigate political crises more easily.   
 The second assertion made above is that individual motivations are more strongly linked to 
identity-driven, legitimacy-oriented factors, rather than economic or security concerns.  Unfortunately, 
the Arab Barometer survey has very few options related to emotional affect concerning the regime, nor 
does it structure it questions on identity such that regression analysis is possible.  However, a key 
measure of legitimacy – trust – is included in all waves of the survey for all our countries. I tested a 
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model including trust in the government (general), and trust in the police forces.  The first stands as an 
imperfect proxy for trust in the leader themselves, especially considering that both in republics and 
monarchies, citizens often draw a distinction between the government writ large and the specific 
leaders.  However, it is the closest approximation I have for leader trust.  Similarly, the police forces are 
also not the leader, but they are often considered to be synonymous with the autocrat, especially in 
highly securitized societies such as Egypt or Tunisia (Bellin 2004).  Of course, these are imperfect 
measures, but when compared with the limited impact of other factors that are more closely linked with 
structural factors (inequality, economic anxiety, lack of security, frustration with pace of reform, etc.) it 
provides some evidence that identity-driven factors are motivating protest across the region.   
 Table 2 presents the results from three more logistic regression models, with the same 
dependent variable of attendance analyzed. This model, however, evaluates motivational covariates, 
rather than methods of mobilization.  The covariates of interest are trust in government, and trust in the 
police forces, with various alternative covariates linked to structural factors measures as well.  Trust in 
government and police were significantly and negatively corelated with protest attendance across all 
three waves, indicating that as trust increases, the tendency to protest decreases.  Perceptions of the 
economy, social inequality, lack of security, and various other structural covariates were not significantly 
correlated, or only occasionally correlated.  In addition, perceptions of corruption in state institutions 
was also correlated with protest attendance in two of our three waves, and as scholars have noticed 
previously, corruption is generally considered to be linked to legitimacy in leadership (Haslam, Reicher, 
























Motivations for Protest Participation 
 Dependent variable: 
 Attendance 
 (Wave 3) (Wave 4) (Wave 5) 
Economic Anxiety .004 0.015 .008 
 (.606) (.049) (.325) 
Lack of Security -.004 .000 NA 
 (.081) (.072)  
Perceptions of Social Inequality .084 .029 NA 
 (.068) (.060)  
Trust in Government -.153* -.113* .087* 
 (.074) (.068) (.042) 
Trust in Police -.190** -.125* .133*** 
 (.068) (.063) (.037) 
Frustration with Lack of Reform .510 .057 NA 
 (.085) (.068)  
Corruption in State Institutions .510* -.068 .204*** 
 (.226) (.085) (.049) 
Jordan -2.07*** -1.34*** -.681*** 
 (.201) (.181) (.107) 
Morocco -1.03*** .614*** 1.30*** 
 (.229) (.148) (.109) 
Egypt -.709*** -1.49*** 0.394*** 
 (.169) (.193) (.108) 
Tunisia NA NA NA 
    
Constant 1.020* -0.023 0.698** 
 (0.606) (0.540) (0.325) 
Observations 3,580 3,469 6,783 
Log Likelihood -935.394 -1,156.700 -2,954.250 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,910.789 2,355.401 5,940.501 
Note: *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<0.001 
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While this model presents evidence – imperfect as it is – that protest attendance is most 
proximately linked to trust in government and state institutions, it is also worth noting that this effect is 
widespread across regime type.  We still see broadly the same effects from our country indicators, as we 
did in the model presented in Table 1, but when controlling for those factors, we still see trust issues as 
a key factor across all states.  Again, this serves to drive home the point that monarchies are not 
immune to trust issues, and that these issues operate in broadly similar ways across varying regime 
types.  However, monarchical legitimacy works to disrupt the link between digital media usage, identity-
driven concerns, and protest attendance.  If an individual does not trust the monarch, then they are 
susceptible to the oppositional frames disseminated online that target the monarch, just as those 
citizens are in republics.   
What we are left with, then, is a puzzle.  Why, if motivations for protest were broadly similar 
across the region, did the monarchies in the analysis experience less protests?  The next section posits 
that the difference is the varying legitimacy of the leaders, and the affective and identity structures tying 
the citizens and the leader together, accounts for the more intense protests in Tunisia and Egypt, 
relative to Jordan and Morocco in the initial wave of Arab Spring discontent.  The monarchs began the 
period with a greater level of baseline legitimacy, due to their credible efforts to project consistency 
with historicized expectations of the past leadership, their relatively less active repressive apparatuses, 
and their less restrictive identity structures.  This process ensured that much of the citizenry felt vaguely 
positive, or a least neutral, affective ties to the monarch, and prevented the spread of opposition 
frames.  The republics on the other hand suffered from historical constraints set by the examples of past 
nationalist leaders such as Nasser and Bourguiba, and their turn toward securitization – rather than 
identity-building - following the deaths of those leaders.  When discontent spread then, diverse groups 
were able to latch onto opposition frames that set the autocrat as the villain of society, and their actions 
during the crises amplified the credibility of those narratives.   
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IV: Social identity, leadership, and legitimacy 
 Having established the link between increased digital media usage and the frequency of mass 
protest, as well as the relevance of identity mechanisms in motivating protests, I have in effect posited 
increased threats to autocratic leaders in the digital age.  Yet, that threat was not felt uniformly across 
MENA countries during and following the Arab Spring.  In particular, those states governed by monarchs 
seemed to experience less intense protests, while those governed as republics-in-name were wracked 
with large-scale demonstrations.  The key difference in these experiences lie in the varying legitimacy of 
leaders, and the extent to which they are credibly identified as villainous actors in broad protest frames.  
Further, legitimacy is intricately tied to the structure of social identity in the leader’s population, a 
structure that works to define the expected behavior and characteristics of a leader.  Finally, due to the 
varying historical identity structures – monarchs are better positioned to maintain, and even innovate 
in, a social identity structure that positions them in a more effective affective position than leaders of 
nationalist republics.    
 Legitimacy has generally been used as a broad concept to describe the extent to which leaders 
are granted a “right to rule” (Hudson 1977; Haldenwang 2017) by a population.  Leaders with high 
legitimacy are generally thought to be able to govern more effectively, provoke limited dissent, and hold 
a broadly positive – or at least neutral – affective attachment to the citizenry.  Importantly, this process 
generally consists of a supply and demand mechanism, by which the leader supplies a claim to 
legitimate authority over a population, and the population articulates demands that describe the type of 
ruler they consider to be legitimate (Haldenwang 2017).  Yet, for this process to function efficiently, the 
supplied claim of legitimacy from the ruler must be legible to the population and consistent with their 
demands.  This double-cycle is shown in Figure 1 below, where the supplied claim is either endorsed or 
rejected by the population; the demands put to the ruler and then either legitimated, compensated, or 
repressed.   
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FIGURE 1: Legitimacy Cycle 
 
SOURCE: Haldenwang 2017 
Yet, what is under-theorized in this process are the varying indicators that determine whether a 
leader’s legitimacy claim is endorsed, and whether or why they choose to either legitimate, compensate, 
or repress the demands of the population.  On its face, a leader should want to offer a legitimacy claim 
that is legible to the population, but how exactly is that accomplished?  What are the consequences if 
that claim is not credible?  Similarly, the leader should want to legitimate the demands of the 
population, as that produces more effective leader-follower interactions and builds trust and positive 
affect with followers.  However, what determines whether a leader is even able or willing to meet these 
demands?  What options are available to them if they struggle to do so?   
As was discovered by the leaders of various MENA states toward the end of the nationalist 
periods, there are certain structural barriers to being able to meet the demands of the population, 
especially if those demands are material in nature.  The promises of a growing middle-class, social safety 
net, and high-quality education of the nationalist period were met with the stark realities of the region’s 
economic weakness during the economic downturn of the 70s and 80s.  The leaders of nationalist 
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republics tended toward a mixture of repression and compensation when their legitimacy was 
challenged (read: rejected according to Figure 1) and when they were unable to meet the legitimation 
demands of their citizenry (Bellin 2004).  The monarchs outside of the oil rich gulf that had survived the 
nationalist period – namely Jordan and Morocco – were able to use repression more selectively, and 
never needed to build large security apparatuses on the scale of the presidents of the region (Anderson 
1991). Given their similarities in terms of economic development/strength, we are left little to explain 
the variation in dissent across states, and the ability of monarchs to maintain legitimacy relative to the 
republicans, especially without resorting to broad repressive tactics.   
 Some portion of this variation may be explained by the mediation effects of social identity on 
the entirety of the legitimation process.  The credibility of an autocrat’s claim to power, the legibility of 
that claim to the populace, the nature of their legitimation demands, and the options available to meet 
those demands all operate under a broader system that ties the leader and populace together through a 
shared history, common culture, and group-based expectations regarding the nature of leadership and 
authority, all of which are encompassed under broad group identities.  Autocrats to a large extent are 
bound by the history of their own states, which generate expectations about how a leader should act.  
The maintenance of a broad identity in which they are legitimate leaders depends in a large extent on 
their ability to embody the traits and behaviors that ground them in a historicized understanding of 
what it means to be a leader, a both cognitive and emotional process that operates through various 
symbols and cues that activate and strengthen affective ties; this is an effort in which monarchs have 
the upper hand over their republican counterparts.  Of course, leaders have choices within those 
constraints, and can work to either strengthen, erode, or perhaps innovate within the social identity 
structure afforded them.  Choices made by the autocrat prior to direct challenges to their legitimacy are 
crucial in building trust among citizens and diffusing – rather than amplifying - large-scale protests, 
which was the experience of the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco.  I will explore the consequences of 
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turning away from identity-driven projects, including the increased vulnerability of the autocrat as 
oppositional identities develop that locate him as the enemy of the people.  
 Scholars in the fields of psychology and sociology have utilized social identity theory to explain a 
number of political processes for decades, focusing on the ways in which individuals identify with larger 
groups, how groups construct in-groups and out-groups, and the implications for political behavior that 
follow these categorizations (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Turner et al. 1987). Generally, people experience 
more positive affect to members of their in-group (Otten and Moskowitz 2000), are more helpful toward 
and trusting of in-group members (Dovidio et. al 1997), and expect members of their in-group to share 
their attitudes and values (Robbins and Krueger 2005).  Yet, while there are numerous facets of social 
identity theory writ large, the aspects that are most relevant for our current study are 1) the Common 
In-group Identity Model and 2) the Social Identity Theory of Leadership.  The first helps to understand 
how historical differences in the experiences of the republics and the monarchies of the Arab World 
contribute to different identity structures, which have systematic implications for the stability and 
applicability of identity groups across wide swaths of society.  The second helps us to understand the 
role – and expectations – of leaders in maintaining their position at the head of identity groups, and the 
implications associated with the success of those efforts, particularly for their ability to communicate 
effectively to group members.   
 The Common Ingroup identity Model (CIIM) was originally developed to understand how 
recategorization of various social groups under a single, superordinate group helps to promoted inter-
group cooperation and reduce bias among previously distinct identity groups (Gaertner and Dovidio 
2000).  The successful construction of a superordinate identity has been associated with effective 
nation-building projects as well as more robust state-society relationships (Transue 2007; Reeskens and 
Wright 2013).  The introduction of CIIM therefore inspired numerous studies on the methods by which 
outside actors might intervene in inter-group conflict to foster common identities, as well as methods by 
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which state leaders can build legitimacy by appealing to a superordinate identity (for examples, see 
Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2007) 
 Yet, the task of building a common group identity is rather complicated, and subsequent studies 
have pointed to the importance of the structure  of a group identity when considering its stability, as 
well as the potentially negative outcomes associated with intervention attempts aimed at creating a 
common identity.  First, scholars have conducted a number of studies indicating that a single, common, 
assimilating group identity is in fact rather unstable (Dovidio and Gaertner 2007).  Derived from 
Brewer’s (1991) Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, they argue that identities that require behavioral or 
value assimilation comes at the expense of an individual’s need to feel unique and differentiated from 
others within the group (Hornsey and Hogg 2000).  As such, even if states construct effective common 
identities, it is likely that over time subordinate group identities will reemerge (Dovidio and Gaertner 
2007).  Second, efforts by illegitimate leaders to construct common identities – or, alternatively, efforts 
by legitimate leaders to incorporate groups that are seen as threatening – may instead produce negative 
reactions and increase intergroup bias, as well as reduce the legitimacy of leaders of identity groups 
(Moss 2017).   
 In response to these complications of CIIM, scholars have begun recently to explore the concept 
of dual-identity structures, under which members perceive two distinct groups under a larger, multi-
faceted superordinate identity (i.e. Catholics and Protestants under the Christian identity) (Dovidio and 
Gaertner 2007).  These identities allow for a level of distinctiveness for subgroups that is particularly 
desirable for minorities and underprivileged, and can avoid the issues that arise when seeking to 
recategorize diverse groups under one common, unified identity, particularly if that common identity 
denies the relevance of subgroups with which individuals strongly identify (ibid.).  Counterintuitively, 
one study has shown that the strength of commitment to a superordinate identity is often enhanced by 
the perception of a strong, subordinate identity (Gonzales and Brown 2003).  The explanations for this 
37 
 
pattern varies, but a popular consensus among scholars in this field is that common identities which 
require assimilation of subgroups can produce identity threat, which causes subgroup members to react 
negatively to assimilation efforts and in general produce a less  stable superordinate identity, whereas 
superordinate identities that allow for a greater degree of multi-culturalism inspire stronger 
identification due to their ability to fulfill needs for distinctiveness amongst subgroups (Dovidio and 
Gaertner 2007). 
 Why is the CIIM relevant for our discussion of the Arab Spring protests?  The nationalist projects 
of Egypt and Tunisia emphasized assimilative common identities (Nasserism in Egypt and Bourguiba’s 
modernization project in Tunisia) that were set counter to more traditional religious and cultural 
identities, providing little space for subgroups to develop strong subordinate identities and agitating 
against any sort of social division.  This assimilative nature not only marginalized religious identities and 
weakened traditional individuals’ identification with the superordinate identity, but it was even unstable 
for more modernized groups that stood to benefit from nationalist development, particularly as severe 
economic inequality developed over time and the promises of modernization went unfulfilled for later 
generations.  Mass defections from the nationalist identities in Tunisia and Egypt therefore attenuated 
the positive effects of a common in-group identity and set society firmly against the state as an 
opposition force.  In contrast, Jordan and Morocco, which did not experience intense nationalist projects 
on the level of Egypt and Tunisia, were able to construct a more multi-faceted superordinate identity 
under the auspices of the monarchy, one which bridged aspects of traditional and modern cultures – 
particularly regarding religion – and did not require the assimilation of various subgroups.  Instead, the 
monarchs of these nations – recalling the political structure of the Ottoman era and the Islamic empire – 
stood as managers of relatively multi-cultural society, above the fray, and therefore avoiding the 
production of identity threat among subgroups.  Furthermore, the ability of the monarch to maintain 
the legitimacy of these founding national identities limited the strength of the opposition arrayed 
38 
 
against them in 2011 and lent credibility to their promises as leaders of the nation in response to 
protest, a credibility not afforded to Mubarak or Ben Ali.   
 Yet, the CIIM is only one facet of the psycho-sociological dynamics that were at play during the 
uprisings of 2011, and it is certainly the case that – during periods of uncertainty and instability – leaders 
are often able to resurrect abandoned identities in order to redirect opposition toward different targets 
(Kinnvall 2004).  Both Mubarak and Ben Ali made direct appeals to their populations, emphasized their 
past association with the iconic nationalist leaders of the past, and attempted to recontextualized the 
strife of the 2011 period as part of the ongoing project of national development – for which they stood 
at the head. Therefore, we need an explanation for why the leaders of Egypt and Tunisia – despite their 
attempts to do so – were ineffective in their efforts to appeal to past nationalist pride in their attempts 
to calm protestors, whereas those of Jordan and Morocco were ultimately successful.  This explanation 
is provided by the Social Identity Theory of Leadership (SITL), which examines the role of leaders in 
constructing and maintaining the national identity they are meant to represent and the implications for 
their leadership efforts should they fail in that pursuit.   
 SITL is a branch of sociological theory that developed out of social identity theory in the early 
2000s (Hogg 2001; Hogg and van Knippenberg 2003), and sought to recontextualize the role of 
leadership as a  “group-membership-based influence process” (Hogg, Knippenberg, Rast III 2012), which 
broke from traditional studies of leadership as organizational/management process based on a social 
contract between leaders and followers.  SITL instead focuses on the cognitive processes that individuals 
undergo during the development of group identities, during which they seek to identify a series of 
prototypical traits that define their group relative to out-groups (Haslam et. al 1995; Hogg, 2005).  SITL 
argues that effective leaders are those that most visibly embody the traits associated with the in-group, 
and that the legitimacy derived from that position ensures that they are perceived as a reliable source of 
normative information, particularly during periods of crisis (Hogg, Knippenberg, Rast III 2012). The 
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implication, according to a prominent scholar of this theory, is that “effective leadership rests 
increasingly on the leader being considered by followers to possess prototypical properties of the 
group” (ibid.)  
 The position of leaders as the archetype of identity group traits has a number of implications for 
politics and society,  First, the embodiment of prototypical groups traits by a leader affords them a 
positive affect from group members and group members are significantly less likely to tolerate criticisms 
of the leadership by other group members (ibid.).  This emotional affect lends prototypical leaders 
legitimacy in their position similar to that thought to be afforded to the monarchs of the Arab world.  
Additionally, research in this field suggest that stronger identification with a group is associated with 
more visible displays of conformity to group norms (Abrams and Hogg 2010), thereby giving leaders a 
key role in maintaining the strength of a given identity group above and beyond the influence of the 
rank and file or even high-ranking members that exist below the leaders (Byrne 1971; Gordon 1996).  
Finally, the embodiment of prototypical traits by group leaders helps follows to construct charismatic 
leadership personalities that further insulate them against criticisms from both in-group and out-group 
members (Platow et al. 2006; van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg 2005).  
 Second – and contingent upon the legitimacy, trust, and charisma derived from prototypicality –  
leaders are able to innovate and define new directions for identity groups, including incorporating 
previously distinct groups into a larger superordinate identity (Hogg and Reid 2006; Reicher and Hopkins 
2003; Seyranian and Bligh 2008).  A leader’s ability to do so relies primarily on the rhetorical and 
communication strategies that s/he employs and the degree to which it aligns with their public 
behaviors (Stone et al. 1997).  Importantly, this process also includes a suspension of disbelief among 
their followers, with highly prototypical leaders given more latitude in their action, even if their behavior 
is not clearly seen to serve the interests of the groups ( Giessner & van Knippenberg 2008; Platow and 
van Knippenberg 2001; Platow et al. 2006; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg 2005). One 
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neuroscientific study showed the varying chemical reactions to similar statements made by prototypical 
leaders and out-group leaders, showing that inspirational messages by in-group leaders activated arts of 
the brain associated with semantic control – the process of encoding information within a larger lexicon 
consistent with an individual’s world beliefs, strengthening confirmation bias – whereas similar 
statements by out-group leaders activated areas of the brain associated with reasoning and criticism 
(Molenberghs et al. 2017).    
 – in addition to sense of fit between the leader and historically-driven expectations of 
leadership – leaders can play an active role in the construction, maintenance, and innovation of group 
identities under their authority.  In fact, a recent review of the psychological research associated with 
leadership identified trait matching – or “being one of us” – as only the first step of four in crafting an 
effective leader-oriented identity (Haslam, Reicher, and Platow 2011).   Beyond the underlying 
prototypicality of a leader, they are expected to be champions of the group, to continually craft a sense 
of group identity, and to make that identity mean something; to demonstrate positive outcomes as a 
result of that identity (ibid).  Importantly, and as noted by previous studies of monarchical success in the 
Arab Spring, monarchs adopted inclusive, cross-cutting identities that were perceived as broadly fair 
across diverse constituencies, a counter to the exclusive identity structures of the republics (Yom and 
Gause III 2012).  leaders carry both antecedent factors that play a role in the level of legitimacy they 
enter office with - factors that I have argued favor monarch – and make choices about how to move 
forward with innovating and maintaining new identity structures.  – the autocrats of the republics failed 
to innovate their identity structures toward the end of the nationalist era, choosing to excluded wide 
swaths of society while simultaneously lacking the underlying charisma and legitimacy that bolstered 
the power of the nationalist leaders prior to them.   
 There are consequences for leaders who are not seen as legitimately prototypical among their 
followers.  Non-prototypical leaders – all else equal – are often associated with the weakening of the 
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strength of identification among group members (Hogg, Knippenberg, Rast III 2012), and suspicion of 
unfair treatment or illegitimate practices towards in-group members has been shown to be much higher 
for leaders who are atypical (Cheng et al. 2009).   Thus, the trust and legitimacy shown to prototypical 
leaders is often eroded as leaders are viewed as less prototypical.  Not surprisingly, this erosion of trust 
has consequences for the ability of leaders to control or define the group identity, or to utilize identities 
as a means to influence hostile populations.  Studies have shown that interventions by illegitimate 
leaders to define a group identity often has the effect of strengthening subordinate identities rather 
than inspiring obedience or superordinate identification (Moss 2017). Similarly, weakening group 
identities can produce anger against leaders that are seen to be the cause of group erosion, and may 
ultimately reverse the process cited in Molenberghs et al. (2017) above, indicating that atypical, out-
group leaders may inspire more uncritical trust than illegitimate in-group leaders (Gaffney, Rast III, and 
Hogg 2018). Finally, leaders who are generally viewed positively in the population can credibly shift 
blame onto other actors who are viewed more negatively.  However, if they themselves are the most 
high-profile, negative figure in the political consciousness, then blame is more likely to fall upon their 
own heads (Hameleers, Bos, and Vrees 2017; Hood 2010). 
 This shift in legitimacy is particularly problematic for autocrats that have traditionally been seen 
as synonymous with the securitized state, as they can quickly become a lightning rod for diverse 
opposition movements to organize around.  The identification of a villain, victim, and hero is a critical 
part of building oppositional identities.  Importantly, both villains and heroes are seen as strong and 
active characters within a larger moral narrative, the only difference between them being their 
perceived morality, whether benevolent or malevolent.  Leaders may begin their careers as some 
version of a hero, but as they make choices that erode citizen trust, or display immoral behaviors, then 
they quickly become the villain of the story, one that can easily become a widespread perception 
through the same digital pathways we covered in the previous section.   
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Similarly, scholars argue that is it a relatively quick process for potential protest participants – 
themselves lacking broad social identifications - to “fuse” with both the victims and heroes provided by 
digital content (Swann et. al 2012).  Fusion is a more extreme type of identification, in which the 
personal and the group identities – rather than competing with each other – are interwoven to the point 
that they are indistinguishable.  This motivates more extreme action in defense of the group or 
individual with which a protester has fused (Swann et. al 2009; Baray et. al 2009). In particular, this 
process is most intense during periods of heightened emotional and physiological activity, the former 
existing in abundance on digital platforms, with the latter a key feature of mass protest movements.  
These processes imply that a leader can quickly lose control of the narrative during periods of intense 
state-society conflict, and to the extent that they are seen as illegitimate, become the sole target of the 
ire of a citizenry that has bonded strongly with characters that have cast the autocrat as illegitimate.  
“We are all Khalid Said” or “We are the 99%” are prime examples of the ways in which these frames can 
help guide unaffiliated citizens toward process of identity fusion that motivates high-risk action, even in 
the face of violent repression. Autocrats who find themselves on the outside of this identity-formation 
process – as experienced by the likes of Mubarak and Ben Ali, among others– are left with little option 
to quell protests, as any increase in activity on their part, or attempts to restore legitimacy, only 
motivate more intense opposition.   
 The focus here has revolved primarily around the autocrat, rather than the various groups and 
institutions that underpin his power.  Why, for example, was anger at Mubarak or Ben Ali so severe, but 
did not transfer to their associates in the military?  With the exception of Mohammad Morsi, each 
successive leader of Egypt following Mubarak’s ouster has been a close associate of the fallen dictator, 
and the military itself is critical to maintaining autocratic power in the country.  Similarly, while there 
was a concerted push to keep the former members of Ben Ali’s party – the RCD – out of government in 
Tunisia, the most recent Tunisia president hailed from the same party, and one of the most powerful 
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parties in the Tunisian legislature is made up almost entirely of past RCD members.  What explains the 
failure of the anger to transfer from the dictator to others?  
 This dynamic provides further justification for the psychological analysis of mass protests in the 
region, and the importance of personalization and character construction in opposition framing.  
Scholars of autocracy have noticed an overall trend toward personalization of autocratic regimes over 
the last few decades, particularly in the MENA region (Geddes et. al 2018). While this is cast as a survival 
mechanism in analyses of autocracy, it also functions to place them as the most available and most 
powerful representation of the regime.  In a digital era that operates on various cognitive heuristics – 
the availability heuristic among them (Weyland 2012) – it is no surprise that the autocrat is the clear 
target of opposition ire.  In particular, the human dimension of the autocrat – distinct from larger, more 
anonymous organizations like the military – triggers more intense behavioral responses that are more 
likely to include empowering emotions such as anger or outrage, rather than disempowering emotions 
associated with more distant group power structure (Muller and Kappas 2010).  The structure of digital 
media in these protests provides opposition with characters in a narrative, characters more easily 
contained within persons than in organizations. The autocrat is clearly the villain in these narratives, and 
while various other individuals and organizations might be associated with him, they tend to be 
categorized as minions, inspiring less direct hatred – or threat – due to their perceptibly limited power 
(Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018).  Overall, the point here is that, due to the psycho-social nature of the 
mass protests in the region, the autocrat is particular is vulnerable to opposition targeting, due to his 
availability and perceived power.  Some portion of that might be transferred to other groups or 
individuals, but that often muddles the narrative, and operates under distinctly different affective 
patterns that may not work to unify mass movements.     
 An identity-drive analysis of leadership and contentious movements in the MENA region thus 
imply that the inability of a leader to legitimately represent prototypical group traits has the effect of 
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weakening identification and inspiring alternative opposition narratives that they cannot control.  This 
simultaneously increases the vulnerability of the autocrat, supplies opposition with a clear villain in their 
protest framing, and severely attenuates – if not reversing altogether – the efficacy of leaders to 
communicate with their population during times of crisis.  By turning to specific case studies in the next 
section, I will argue that the different experiences of monarchies and republics stems from the differing 
affective and identity structures inherent in their varying regime structures, as well as the specific 
history of individual autocrats.  The late republican dictators of Tunisia and Egypt were bound by an 
obligation to embody an arguably unrealistic set of personality traits derived from a near-hagiographic 
conceptualization of nationalist leaders of the past, leaders who were foundational to the national 
identities of their respective states.  Their inability (or unwillingness) to embody these traits, combined 
with negative outcomes in the socio-economic sphere, served to weaken the already unstable 
assimilative identities their predecessors passed on to them.  Over time, their consistent and visible 
subversion of this identity – made more visible by public criticism – inspired anger against the leaders 
and produced a group identity aligned in opposition to their leadership, effectively recategorizing these 
leaders as out-group members.  Thus, their efforts during the uprisings to quell protests by offering 
reform and appealing to the need for national unity backfired, reinforcing their image as an illegitimate 
medium of communication and cementing themselves as the target of national ire.  In contrast, the 
monarchs of Jordan and Morocco were not so bound by expectations to be transformative, world-
beating nationalist leaders, drawing instead on conceptualizations of monarchical rule were closer to 
administrative rulers of the Ottoman Empire, a far easier set of traits to embody than those transmitted 
by Nasser in Egypt or Bourguiba in Tunisia. Over time, their public efforts to reinforce their image as 
group leader - and to incorporate newer, modern identities – afforded them the legitimacy that scholars 
observe in the monarchies of the modern Arab world.  Thus, during the protest of 2011, their offers of 
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reform were seen as legitimate communication by the leader to address in-group issues, and inspired 

























V: Case studies 
 
This section provides a brief discussion of the historical development of national identities in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan in order to show the processes of social identity theory at work in these 
nations.  This is not meant to be a rigorous case study, but more an effort at bringing more abstract 
concepts into a more concrete narrative.  Mubarak and Ben Ali inherited an assimilative, unstable 
national identity that carried leadership expectations that they were both unwilling and unable to 
emulate.  This led to the weakening of their position as national leaders as well as the superordinate 
Egyptian/Tunisian identities, and damaged their ability to effectively demobilize protests in 2011.  The 
monarchs on the other hand inherited a more complex national identity that was 1) more stable and 2) 
had effectively incorporated both modern and traditional social groups (Anderson 1991).  In addition, 
the monarchs were invested with more realistic expectations in terms of the traits they were meant to 
embody, enabling them to maintain their positions at the head of a legitimate superordinate identity 
group.  Thus, when communicating to protestors in 2011, they were able to demobilize significant 
numbers through the promise of reform.  Importantly, shifts in the post-Arab Spring period show that 
successive leaders may be able to reestablish a claim to legitimacy, either through serious efforts at 
reform (as is the case in Tunisia), or by appealing to a newly unsettled/threatened sector of society (as 
was the case in Egypt).  Similarly, autocrats may weaken their legitimacy if they take actions deemed 
unsuitable to their station (as in Morocco), though again, preexisting positive affect may help to shift 
blame onto other state actors, and allow the autocrat to retain most of their authority (as in Jordan).   
  
Egypt 
 Gamal Abdel Nasser is perhaps the most well-known Arab leader of the 20th century, and 
certainly the most famous Arab nationalist in the international arena. Rising to prominence in 1952 as 
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part of the Free Officers coup d’état, he became prime minister in in 1954, forcing the resignation of 
then-Naguib, who had intentions to align more closely with the established political forces of the Wafd 
and the Muslim Brotherhood (Kandil 2014). He would later ascend to the presidency in 1956.  After 
initially seeking to merge Islamism with Socialism through his manipulation of the willing ulema of Al-
Azhar mosque, he later abandoned that project in favor of a pure Socialist agenda fueled by state 
control over the economy (Aburish 2004, 203-4), and later had the rebellious leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood – Sayyid Qutb – executed on dubious charges of planning to assassinate him (ibid. 238-9).  
From that point on, he pursued a Pan-Arabist, secular project of nation building that saw Egypt 
challenge powerful international forces on the issues of the Suez Canal and Israel, as well as 
marginalizing Islamist forces at home.  
 Most relevant for our study is the way in which Nasser sought to define a new direction for 
Egypt that was increasingly secular and socialist, one that delegitimized politics based upon alternative 
cultural models, particularly Islam, and actively repressed challenges to his regime from that quarter 
(Jankowski 2001, 37).  Some even argue that this relentless push for national unity was driven by his 
own personal identity crises early in life (ibid. 39), but however he came to it, Nasser went to great 
lengths to define an Arab-Egyptian identity as a secular, socialist group that did not recognize the value 
of ethnic diversity or religious values as political organizing principles, famously arguing that “for the 
Muslim is a human being before he is a Muslim” (ibid. 38). Importantly, Nasser was also socially 
conservative and distinctly Arab in his identity, and agitated against the Western cosmopolitanism that 
characterized his successor, Anwar Sadat (ibid.).  Thus, despite a political ideology that sought to keep 
religious organizations out of politics, he still was seen to embody traits that were classically Arab, 
including an adherence to Islamic principles in his daily life (Osman 2010).   
Consequently, the image that Nasser presented to the world was one of totalizing Arab unity, 
based on secular, socialist economic policies but simultaneously invoking the social character of the 
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Arab strongman associated with earlier tribal warlords.  He reinforced his position as leader of this 
identity group with moderately successful economic policies (in the early years) and a number of highly 
visible international move, most notably his confrontation with the British over the nationalization of 
the Suez Canal.  Over time, his followers began to call themselves Nasserists, a term he opposed, but 
one which reflected the degree to which he had cemented himself as the archetype of Arab identity 
both in Egypt and abroad (Aburish 2004, 203). Notably, this initial legitimacy insulated him against 
future economic problems and military defeat, with supporters going so far as the publicly refute the 
announcement of his resignation following the catastrophic Six Day War of 1967 (Kandil 2012, 84). 
Yet, this image of Egypt as a resurgent nationalist force on the international scene was 
inherently untenable in the context of regional geo-politics.  This was a situation recognized by his 
successor Anwar Sadat who, following Nasser’s death, began a project of De-Nasserization that included 
releasing political prisoners, rewriting school textbooks, and ultimately reaching a peace agreement with 
Israel, an event that was viewed both at home and abroad as a betrayal of the Pan-Arabism that Nasser 
had promoted (Cull, Culbert, and Welch 2003, 18).  Though these represented savvy political moves in 
the structural arena – given the economic weakness of Egypt and the ascendancy of the Pro-Israel 
international sphere - they eroded the degree to which Egyptians identified with the national project 
began by Nasser, and breathed life into a marginalized opposition that had never been part of the larger 
superordinate identity under Nasser.  This, combined with the public’s view of Sadat as a Western 
cosmopolitan, resulted in his death at the hands of Islamist assassins and the election of Hosni Mubarak 
as head of the Egyptian government.   
Though Mubarak had already inherited a broken national identity from Sadat, he did little to 
rebuild that identity in subsequent years, due likely to the military’s unwillingness to again cede so much 
power to a given individual.  Yet, seeing a revived Islamist opposition, Mubarak dramatically expanded 
the power of the internal security forces of Egypt and cracked down on any opposition forcefully, 
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leading to a further erosion of the trust between state and society in Egypt, and cementing his position 
as the source of ire for opposition activists (Osman 2010, 170). Similarly, allegations of personal 
corruption and efforts to install his son as a supposed successor were seen as further subversions of the 
promises made by the new Egypt in the mid-20th century (ibid.).  This was reinforced by criticism over 
time that sought to further deride the personal traits of the Egyptian leader, as novel activists attacked 
his personal appearance, his military credentials, and his double-sided position on Israel (Khraidy 2016).  
Taken together, these actions ensured that Mubarak was no longer a legitimate representative of a 
broken national identity, and in fact had – over time – become a source of ire for a newly forming 
opposition identity that would eventually unite both liberal and Islamist elements of Egypt (Gause III 
2011).  It should therefore come as no surprise that his efforts to calm protestors in 2011 were 
ineffective.  Mubarak addressed his citizens on February 10th 2011, during which he promised reforms, 
swore off his participation in future presidential elections, and with tears in his eyes, recounted the pain 
he felt for the lost eminence of Egypt since the Nasser years (Youtube).  His announcement was met 
with ire, his tears with laughter, and days later he was removed from office.   
Thus, bound by the mistakes of his past, Mubarak had weakened his ability to effectively divide 
the population between secular and religious groups, a move that had been successful in the past.  
Unfortunately, both groups had come to truly despise his leadership, and they were united in their 
opposition to him.  However, subsequent events reveal the extent to which the underlying perceptions 
of the citizenry can shift over time, and the extent to which different psychological states can shift 
citizen preferences for leadership, or make them more receptive to past legitimacy claims that they may 
have sought to throw off.  In particular, the narrow election of Mohammad Morsi – one driven largely by 
populations outside of large cities – drove a wedge between the secular and religious elements of the 
opposition movement.  Morsi may have fit an Islamist image of leadership, especially in his challenges to 
the secular state, but he simultaneously violated the expectations of the secular coalition that had 
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helped overthrow Mubarak.  In Morsi was the materialization of years and years of government 
warnings about the threat of Islamist leadership, and each move he made consolidate power in the 
presidency and push Egypt toward Islamic governance activated the fears of the secular coalition.   
Morsi himself perhaps recognized the dangers the secular coalition presented for his 
government.  A year into office, he gave a public address admitting numerous “mistakes” in his first 
year, and pointedly praising the army, which had been viewed as a guarantor of stability during periods 
of crisis in the last few years. However, the affective patterns constructed by his previous rhetoric were 
clear: Morsi was a threat to the freedoms of secular Egyptians.  By fall of 2013, there were intense 
protests against Morsi’s leadership, protests during which the army was called upon to restore order 
and protect the modest gains made during the uprising.  While it is an oft-criticized institution, the army 
has been central to Egypt’s national identity from the years of Nasser, and for many Egyptians, their 
connection to the army was familial, with recruitment drawing from a broad base of Egyptian society. 
Thus, When the army overthrew Morsi in November 2013, rather than label in the coup that it was, 
large portions of secular Egypt hailed it as a second revolution,  and in Sisi – a previous Mubarak 
associate- they had a reiteration of Nasser, an image made robust by glowing reports of Sisi’s 
interactions with everyday Egyptians.  In addition, Sisi constructed a narrative parallel to that of Nasser, 
a military official seizing control of a listing ship, and righting it in the name of a better Egypt.  
The post Arab Spring experience of Egypt serves to underline the psychological components of 
legitimate authority, components themselves that are subject to quick change in the midst of chaotic 
social conditions.  Previous to the Arab Spring, a stagnating Egypt sought the removal of a military leader 
who had degraded the office.  Yet, in 2013, they sought comfort in a military leader that could restore 
order to their politics.  Similarly, acts of violence by the regime that might have sparked outrage during 
the Arab Spring were routinely ignored in the early Sisi period.  This is largely because initial crackdowns 
focused on Islamists, protesting Sisi’s rule and the removal of Morsi.  At that point, however, identities 
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had shifted in Egypt, and those Islamists that might have been with secularists in 2011 now represented 
a threat to the life of secular Egyptians. This shift ensured that these crackdowns, which were far more 
brutal and violent than any during the Arab Spring – and perhaps, the Mubarak era generally – would go 
unremarked by wide swaths of the population.  Sisi had, once again, divided and conquered the Egyptian 
people.  
The lesson of the Egyptian example points to the variability of psycho-social factors that drive 
patterns of identity, especially as they progress through periods of varying political stability.  Given 
Mubarak’s long reign, affective attitudes toward his leadership were largely set, and difficult to adjust.  
Sisi, on the other hand, was able to manipulate the insecurity of a post-2011 Egypt to refashion himself 
as a hero figure, cast against the villainous Morsi.  These largely reflect recent neuro-scientific research 
on emotion and anxiety, with their broad affective patterns interrupted by specific, intense, and volatile 
periods during which emotions catalyze and shift.  Whether Sisi himself continues to the be the 
benefactor of this shift remains to be seen.  His popularity soared in his early reign, but has since waned 
on the back of a broadly repressive campaign against wide sectors of Egyptian society, and his base is 
beginning to show signs of agitation. He would likely do well to heed those rumblings, and the 
legitimation demands associated with them.   
 
Tunisia 
The experience of Ben Ali in Tunisia parallels that of Mubarak in Egypt.  Tunisia’s nationalist 
leader, Habib Bourguiba, led the struggle for independence for Tunisia, during which he was labeled, the 
“Supreme Combatant,” and served as Tunisia’s first president from 1957-87.  During that time, 
Bourguiba developed an intense cult of personality, due in large part to his success as military fighter 
and to his implementation of relatively successful economic development projects that would 
dramatically alter the social and educational landscape of Tunisia.  
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Key to his project to construct a modern Tunisia was Bourguiba’s marginalization of the religious 
establishment, and his whole-hearted adoption of Western (read, French) style education and legal 
structures.  He drove Islamist organizations underground, and went even further in attempts to 
eradicate religiosity in general from the public, once famously drinking a glass of orange juice on public 
television during Ramadan in an exhortation to the public to abandon fasting (Abderrahim 1989).  This 
was reflection of his vision of a modern Tunisia, which explicitly blamed the traditional Tunisia culture – 
primarily its religiosity – for the underdevelopment it suffered in the 20th century (ibid.).  That said, his 
economic and educational programs were quite successful relative to the experience of other Arab 
polities, and a significant sector of Tunisians adopted his modern national identity, looking towards 
Europe, rather than Levant, for their social model (ibid.).  Thus, as was the case with Nasser, Bourguiba 
cemented a unified, totalizing national identity that placed himself at the head, as a war-hero of the 
independence movement and modern reformer shepherding Tunisia into the modern world.  
Importantly, this effort did not respond to broad legitimation demands of religious parts of Tunisia, but 
his modernization project was hailed as a boon to an economically struggling society, and as such stood 
as a compensation for legitimation demands, rather than a full recognition of them.  Moreover, by 
linking the choice of participation in modernization to increased welfare, his project effectively siloed 
dissent within the hyper-religious of Tunisian society, who were ideologically motivated enough to reject 
those promises in favor of principles, but represented relatively few in number.  
Though it took a long time for Islamists to reemerge and present a challenge to the Tunisian 
state, Bourguiba himself made moves that eroded his legitimacy later in life.  As his health declined and 
his economic projects faltered, Tunisians began to protest the lack of political reform that they saw as 
part and parcel of the modernization project that he himself championed (Belkhodja 1998).  Similarly, 
clientelism became rampant as he lost control of his political underlings and frustration with his regime 
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grew.  By the time he was removed from power by Ben Ali, he had already done significant damage to 
the national identity he had helped to forge.   
Ben Ali failed to revitalize the support afforded Bourguiba during his presidency. After executing 
a coup d’état during which he cited Bourguiba’s failing health as a cause of the problems in Tunisia’s 
politics. Yet, during his early days in office he did little to address the issues that most frustrated 
Tunisians, particularly the problem of rigged elections.  He began to be associated more with the later 
days of Bourguiba’s reign, where rampant corruption and self-serving behavior was the norm, behavior 
that was frequently criticized in contrast to that of Bourguiba (Cavatorta and Haugbolle 2012). Over time 
the extravagant corruption exhibited by his wife and extended family, which frequently raided state 
coffers to finance large houses, expensive trips, and highly visible parties further reinforced the public 
image of Ben Ali as a corrupt, self-serving autocrat (Anderson 2011).  He responded to this criticism by 
severely reducing the freedom of the press, and move seen as a betrayal of the modern identity forged 
by Bourguiba, and limped through the middle years of his presidency with a moderately successful 
economy (Dickovick 2008).  However, as the economy slowed in the last decades before his demise, and 
the gap between the rich and poor increased, youth found themselves out of jobs, and his corruption 
continued unabated, he soon became the target of opposition ire.  HIs subsequent efforts to reshuffle 
his cabinet, the promise of thousands of new jobs, and the dismissal of hated governors in problem 
areas were ignored by protestors, and Ben Ali fled the country weeks later.   
Thus, as is the case in Egypt, we observe the erosion of a foundational national identity that was 
established by a strong leader, and later subverted by future political events.  In the case of Tunisia, this 
subversion was less a function of political constraints, and more a result of decisions by Bourguiba 
himself and his successor, but the eventual result was the same.  Tunisians across the hinterland of the 
country, previously staunch supporters of the economic development that had employed them in 
manufacturing, began to foster alternative identities, based largely on their religious communities.  Even 
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on the coast the broken promises of political pluralism and freedom of speech, as well as the eroding 
efficacy of Tunisia education in the international economy, caused mass disillusionment with the 
previously strong Tunisian identity; an identity that was eventually reinvigorated through opposition to 
Ben Ali himself.   
Again, the post Arab Spring period in Tunisia offers lessons on how governments may 
reconstitute their legitimacy following crises.  In this instance, rather than reinvigoration social division 
of the past, the Tunisian leadership responded to legitimation claims with validation.  In the first 
instance, they made significant and true democratic reform to their state, a move that they were 
structurally well-positioned to make, but a bold one nevertheless.  In the interim, an interesting dynamic 
has developed in Tunisian politics in which protests serve as a regular vehicle for expressing dissent 
among the population (Berman 2018).  Rather than respond to these protests with violence, subsequent 
regimes have instead bent to the demands of protestors on numerous occasions.  The most notable of 
these instances was the government response to the sustained protests in 2013, levied against the 
dominance of the Islamist party Ennahda in Tunisia elections. There were a number of factors that 
prompted these demonstrations, including the rise of Islamic radicalism in the country and a series of 
high-profile assassinations of secular leaders.  Rather than respond to these protests in the way Morsi 
might have, a more moderate Rached Al-Ghannouci responded by promising that Ennahda’s coalition 
would step down.  He handed over government authority to Beji Caid Essebsi, a previous Ben Ali 
associate who led a technocratic party staffed largely with previous members of Ben Ali’s party.  Yet, 
Ghannouci had recognized the shifting landscape of identification, and rather than weaken his political 
position by responding in a way that would confirm the prejudices of protester, he instead defused it by 






 The foundational narrative of the Jordanian monarchy is far different than the experiences of 
nationalism in Egypt and Tunisia, and those differences have contributed to the monarch’s ability to 
build and maintain a relatively stable national identity that is at once multi-faceted and firmly 
establishes the monarch as the head of the superordinate identity group, above tribal, religious, and 
ethnic subordinate identities.  Modeling themselves in part after the religious rulers of the Arabian 
peninsula – from whence the Hashemite family came – and in part after the administrators of the 
colonial period,  the monarchs have been able to walk a fine line of traditional and modern legitimacy 
that lends them credibility during times of crises and prevents direct challenges to their rule, largely 
through the structure  of the identity they have built in Jordan and the traits they embody as its leaders. 
 From the beginning, the appointment of the Hashemite dynasty as rulers of Jordan by Winston 
Churchill was seen by many as the establishment of an outsider ruler by colonial powers (which, of 
course, it was).  However, in a land rocked by tribal divisions and dealing with the influx of Palestinians 
from the Arab-Israeli war of 1952, the impartiality of the monarch was seen as a benefit (Ryan 2018, 97).  
From the beginning, the monarchy could present itself as a unifying force bringing together a 
surprisingly diverse set of communities, denying none of them – at least initially (ibid.).  Importantly, 
Hussein was not expected to be a military leader or to transform Jordanian society in the way that the 
nationalists of Egypt and Tunisia had.  Instead, the Hashemite – invested with historical religious and 
tribal authority – were tasked with maintaining a balance between existing social groups.  That said, 
Abdullah I was plagued by the issue of Palestine and Israel, and at the founding of modern Jordan there 
were numerous Palestinian militants that strongly opposed Abdullah’s moderate nature, and feared he 
would sign a peace treaty with Israel.  This fear eventually led to his assassination in 1951.   
 Yet, despite a rocky start to Jordanian independence, Abdullah’s grandson Hussein took power 
as both a representative of religious, tribal Arabia and as a liberal reformer intent on bringing Jordan 
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into the modern world, beginning with the institution of democratic elections in 1956.  Unfortunately, 
continuing unrest in the Palestinian community, and the disastrous Six Day War waylaid those plans, and 
for a long period in the mid 20th century, Jordan was under martial law, and agitated increasingly against 
Palestinian identities in Jordan (Ryan 2018, 96).  While the Palestinian threat was sufficient excuse for 
East Bank Jordanians to forgo elections for some time, the expulsion of Palestinian militants from Jordan 
and the renunciation of West Bank control in 1988 to some extent settled the Palestinian question in 
Jordan, and the increasingly dire economic situation led to mass protests in 1989, and the reopening of 
parliament shortly after (Lucas 2012).   
 Key to our study, however, was the way in which Hussein, and his son Abdullah II after him, has 
been able to serve as a balancing force between East Bank Jordanians, consistently aware of the threat 
posed to their identity and political power, as well as – to the extent he was able – integrating 
Palestinian communities into Jordanian society, all the while providing various outlets for groups to 
pursue their interests – East Bankers in the parliament and Palestinians/Islamists in economy and 
society (Ryan 2018, 98).  Though Hussein sought to suppress the Palestinian identity in the political 
sphere, the political opening of 1989 ignited very public debates on the role of Palestinians in Jordan, 
and to this day the Palestinian identity remains alive and well, with Palestinian having served a key role 
in the development of the Jordanian economy (ibid. 101).  As such, Jordanian national identity has come 
to approximate the more complex identities seen as more stable, where superordinate identities are 
reinforced by strong subordinate identities as the tribal, ethnic, and religious level (ibid).   
 In Hussein’s son, Abdullah II, the various sub-groups of Jordan have each found in him traits 
representative of their specific identity group.  He maintains religious authority through his association 
with the lineage of the Prophet Mohammad and has successfully coopted the Salafi community and 
parts of the Muslim Brotherhood into his larger political project (Wagemakers 2016).  He maintains his 
tribal credibility both through the continued political preference offered to tribal leaders in parliament 
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and his association as a military leader – of which tribal members make up the majority – an image that 
he maintains through many public appearances in uniform and involvement in some military actions.  
For the burgeoning cosmopolitan class in Jordan, Abdullah’s education in Britain, Western mother, 
business suits, and economic liberalization projects have reinforced his image as a modern ruler.  Finally, 
for the Palestinians, Abdullah’s marriage to Palestinian-Jordanian, Queen Rania, as well as his support 
for a private economy in which Palestinians are dominant, has given them something to identify with as 
well.  Of course, he is rarely forced to extremes in his embodiment of these various traits.  In fact, doing 
so would be highly detrimental to the health of the Jordanian identity as a whole, as it would likely 
produce identity threat among other groups who were not part of his performance.  Thus, absent the 
expectations generated by nationalist movements, he has been able to successfully embody the desired 
traits of various sub-groups in Jordan.  This, combined with the historic stability of Jordan relative to the 
other parts of the Arab world (a distinct out-group), has reinforced his legitimacy as the leader of Jordan 
and consolidated the Jordan identity is a manner that does not require sub-group assimilation (Tobin 
2012)  
 Yet, Jordan still suffers from severe economic and political constraints due to it resource-poverty 
and geo-political position, and the fortunes of a number of key subgroups have waned over the years.  
Chief among them are the tribal groups, which have seen their economic situation deteriorate 
significantly, a trend they see as a betrayal of the contract upon which their support of the monarchy 
rests (Ryan 2018, conclusion).  However, when confronted with protests made up largely by tribal 
members, Abdullah was able to act as a credible communicator, offering political reforms that would 
have the greatest effect on the tribal members themselves, and repeatedly emphasizing the need for 
stability, an exceptional trait enjoyed by Jordan and one appreciated both by the tribes and those 
involved in the private economy (Tobin 2012).  Rather than inspiring further ire, Abdullah had put in the 
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work previously to maintain his position as legitimate leader of the Jordanian identity, and thus was able 
to lead effectively during a period of crisis.  
 Years on from the Arab Spring protests, Jordan still faces economic and security issues, and King 
Abdullah II has been forced to juggle a series of demands placed upon the government.  Most notable 
among them are the protests that broke out in early 2019 in response to a taxation bill included under a 
broad austerity program, one endorsed by Abdullah himself. The ensuing discontent actually exceeded 
the numbers of the Arab Spring protests in 2013, and forced the resignation of a recently elected prime 
minster, as well as the dissolution of the Jordanian parliament.  Yet, as observers have noted, the king 
was largely able to avoid during this period, even though the subsequent prime minister reintroduced 
largely the same tax bill – and protests broke out again (Williamson 2018).  Again, protests targeted a 
specified elite class that the new prime minister is a part of, yet that prime minister was appointed by 
the king, and his appointment reflected a shift in attitude by the king toward a capitalist Ammani class, 
and away from his tribal base. Yet, blame tends to fall on the those who are viewed negatively by the 
blamers, and it seems clear that Abdullah had done enough to retain the affective connection with a 
wide enough swath of the citizenry.  That said, scholars have noted that a new generation of tribal 
Jordanians, their affective ties to the regime made weaker by their limited experiences, made sow the 
seeds for an eventual challenge to the monarchy in the future (Ryan 2018).   
 
Morocco 
 The experience of Morocco was similar to that of Jordan, in that it was founded on a Hashemite 
monarchy that claimed a lineage descended from Prophet Mohammed.  In fact, the title of the monarch 
has long been “Commander of the Faithful.”  This, combined with the long history of monarchy that has 
recognized distinct ethnic and social groups in the kingdom, provided a base for building a complex 
identity that could incorporate the traditional groups of Morocco.  As previously cited, the monarchy has 
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maintained its religious authority through numerous public displays meant to reflect the master-disciple 
relationship common to the unique religious history of Morocco (Hammoudi 1997).  Additionally, it 
utilized the resources of French occupation to coopt Berber tribes – previously hostile to the monarchy – 
into its identity structure pre-independence (Clark 2018, 67). 
 It is important to note that early on the days of independence, the monarchy suffered from 
legitimacy problems from more modern movements, particularly the nationalists who viewed the king 
as a supporter of rural and traditional authorities (ibid).  This lack of legitimacy encouraged King Hassan 
II to rely increasingly on the military to repress urban political forces (ibid, 68; Willis 2012, 83). Yet as 
corruption became rampant within the monarchy and rural elites saw the king’s efforts at 
democratization as having the potential to erode their political power, the military attempted coups in 
1971 and 1972 (Willis 2012, 90; Sater 2010, 36; Storm 2007, 32).  Thus, as long as the king relied too 
heavily on one social group over another, he struggled to construct a Moroccan national identity for 
which he could be an effective leader for significant portions of the population. 
 This situation changed following the coups of the 1970s, as the king sought to expand his base of 
support to more urban political groups.  Beginning with the institution of democratic elections and the 
easing of repression, Hassan II then embarked upon a project designed to coopt the nationalist 
movement into his coalition.  He achieved this through a series of public nationalizations for foreign 
businesses (Clark 2018, 70), the institution of a number of social programs aimed at increasing human 
development (ibid 71), and the public campaign to reclaim the Western Sahara, which effectively united 
diverse sectors of Moroccan society (ibid.).  Hassan was able to succeed in this project through the use 
of phosphate rents, which allowed him to implement populist economic projects and buy off elites 
simultaneously (ibid 72). 
 Yet, as phosphate prices dropped and the economic health of large sectors of the Moroccan 
economy dipped, the king struggled to maintain his coalition, and riots ensued in the 1980s over the 
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price of bread. However, rather than resort to repression, the monarchy responded with further political 
liberalization that portrayed itself as reformer to social groups, while simultaneously coopting a civils 
society elite into a loyalist position within the state structure, an effort that resulted in the appearance 
of political pluralism without the political reality of a legitimate opposition (ibid. 73).  Similarly, the 
decentralization efforts of the monarchy in the late 20th century effectively shifted the blame for 
negative policies to local political actors, and recast the monarch as a political fixer that could appear 
during times of crises and reverse the outcomes caused by local actors (ibid 154).  This pattern 
continued into the reign of Mohammad VI, with Mohammad additionally casting himself as a leader 
unwilling to use repression on his people, a characteristic that remained a dark hallmark of Hassan II’s 
rule and further cemented the image of the monarchy as a flexible, consultative institution.  This was a 
critical shift for Mohammad VI, as a recent study have shown that descendants of those who were 
repressed in Morocco during Hassan II’s rule were far more likely to participate in protests against the 
regime, and to mobilize their connections toward the same goal (Lawrence 2017).  
 Key to the Moroccan experience is the degree to which appearances, rather than political 
realities, drove outcomes among the citizens of Morocco.  The monarchy was able to construct a 
pluralistic, cross-cutting coalition of supporters through selective incentives and material payoffs, yet 
the image presented to the public was one of a leader committed to true political pluralism, one that 
stood against corruption at the local level, and one that could serve as a shepherd of Moroccan society 
as it developed.  These images were reinforced by a number of public demonstrations of the traits 
expected of monarch and served to hide the hard political maneuvering occurring behind the scene.  It is 
therefore no surprise that – when confronted with political opposition in 2011 – a significant segment of 
the protestors in Morocco saw his offers of reform as consistent with the image of the monarch as a 
consultative political fixer, representing diverse sectors of the Moroccan society, rather than a 
representation of the hard political strategy that had been hidden well by the state over the years.  This 
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identity, enabled by the history of monarchy in Morocco and the political maneuverings of Hassan II, 
enhanced the legitimacy of Mohammad VI as a representative of the Moroccan identity, and enabled 
him to influence opposition by recalling the traits expected by population.   
As stated previously, however, monarchies are not immune to shifts in trust, particularly if the 
breach is associated with behavior that is seen to extend beyond the expectations that citizens have for 
a position of authority.  Mohammad VI discovered this in 2011, when, in a effort to exert more direct 
control over the legislature in Morocco (as well as the rewrite of the constitution), threw his support 
behind the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), resulting in significant backlash from the Moroccan 
citizenry, and a dismal election-day showing for the PAM.  The PAM had previously been criticized as the 
king’s party, and the king’s involvement in the electoral politics of Morocco was seen as an overreach by 
Mohammad VI (Speigel 2015).  This is consistent with our earlier discussion of character work, in which 
individuals are more likely to be considered heroes to the extent that they remain relatively passive, 
activating in response to threats rather than in pursuit of their own interests.  In this scenario, the king 
became active not in response to an identified threat, but instead to help shore up his own political 
power, enhancing the efficacy of the villain trope. 
Despite stumbling the king had regained some legitimacy by the time protests broke out in Al-
Hoceima in 2016, over the death of a fishmonger by security forces.  Protest were met with harsh 
repression from local forces, and threatened to overwhelm the country.  However, in this instance, 
Mohammad VI refrained from choosing sides, or taking the opportunity to back political allies.  Instead, 
he harshly criticized the actions of security forces, and the government of that region, in fact forcing the 
resignation of the top PAM officials in the region and in the central government.  While protests 
continued to rage on, they never reached the point of blaming the king, nor did they spread so far as to 
engulf wider Moroccan society.  Instead, Mohammad VI crafted the image of the protests within the 
historical discontent of the Rif region in Morocco, where the protests originated, one that fit squarely 
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within the broader national narrative of Moroccan politics, within which the position of the Rif is widely 
recognized and understood.  More importantly, the king was once again seen as responding to a crisis, a 
model more consistent with the hero narrative, and targeting the actions of the villains (government 
leadership) in their response.  
In summation, the above case studies were meant to provide a narrative example of some of 
the more abstract concepts that were discussed in the previous section on identity in leadership, as well 
as a demonstration of some of the effects of autocrat behavior within the context of the Arab Spring 
uprisings.  In the first two cases, we saw a pair of dictators that inherited unstable and flailing nationalist 
projects, sparking severe social resistance early in their reigns. In response, they sought to divide and 
conquer, manipulating the fears of a secular portion of the population by targeting Islamist political 
movements.  While this strategy was initially successful, the expansion of repressive tactics, 
personalization of power, and increasingly immoral public behavior of Ben Ali and Mubarak eroded the 
wider modernist-identity projects the previous leaders had attempted to build, and expanded the 
perception of the autocrat as a bad actor to wide swaths of society;  their personal security forces and 
subservient legislatures further aligned their images with that of a powerful, active villain that soon 
became seen as the root of all problems in the country.  Thus, with the expansion of digital media usage, 
and the ability of that technology to construct and mobilize an oppositional community united around 
common hatred of the leader, the autocrats in those states were left highly vulnerable to challenges to 
their authority, and ill-equipped to handle them when they came.   
The experience of monarchies, on the other hand, consisted of a less transformative, perhaps 
more stable identity structure inherited via familial descent, which afforded them a baseline legitimacy 
attached to a cultural history, one that they cultivated extensively and innovated upon when required.  
As such, they have maintained a broadly positive – or at least neutral – emotional valence with the 
population.  Importantly, their formal position above the political fray and limited, selective repression 
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tactics have ensured that their profile more readily fits that of the hero – a potential, less active power – 







































 I have argued here that – in an increasingly digitized world – that autocratic strength relies more 
heavily on their legitimacy and the underlying identity structures that support their claim to power.  In 
particular, monarchies of the MENA region were better positioned to confront the mass mobilization of 
the Arab Spring uprisings.  This variation stems from a number of sources, including the structure of 
monarchical government, its connection to both modern and traditional cultural models, its stabler 
identity structures, and the work of modern monarchs to maintain and innovate within those structures 
over time.  In contrast, the republics of the MENA region inherited an unstable, assimilative identity 
structure from the nationalist era, one that they initially failed to embody, and then chose to ignore in 
favor of increasing securitization, institutional dominance, and economic power.  The result was that 
republican autocrats were left vulnerable to the influence of digital media, where opposition frames 
casting them as villains found broad, deep resonance with diverse sectors of society, encouraging 
mobilization on a scale that was powerful enough to the drive the leaders out of office.  
 This shift in the composition of autocratic strength has implications for both dictators and 
regimes going forward.  First, it implies an inherent danger in the personalization strategies that most 
leaders have adopted in the modern era (Geddes et. al 2018).  Personalization might be an effective 
strategy for staving off the threat posed by the political elite (Svolik 2012), and indeed, it may be a 
useful tool for constructing a national identity around charismatic leadership, as was the case for Nasser 
and Bourguiba.  However, it may also act as a double-edged sword as that charisma fades, or as the 
autocrat exhibits traits and behaviors that subvert the narrative of power they have constructed;  as the 
autocrat becomes more powerful and active, they are more easily cast as villains in oppositional 




 Of course, the decisions an autocrat make in the effort to keep or consolidate power are not 
always obvious, and should not be treated as such.  With hindsight, we might criticize Mubarak or Ben 
Ali for failing to ignore the long-term implications of their actions, but in the moment they surely felt 
bound by international economic and security structures, and threatened by the potential power of 
radical political elements and the elite alike.  As such, the decision to turn away from the nationalist 
projects of previous eras, and to pursue a divide-and-conquer/compensate strategy, rather than 
attempt to reconstitute their legitimacy, seemed like a savvy move.  Indeed, it worked for decades in 
both cases.  The major thrust of this report, however, is the claim that underlying structural conditions 
have changed, and issues of identity and behavior have taken on increasing relevance for autocratic 
stability.  Whereas the common consensus of autocratic scholars were that the largest threat to a 
dictator was the elite with which they surround themselves (Svolik 2012), it seems increasingly likely 
that those same threats are intertwined with the perceptions of the masses, that a potential coup d’état 
may hinge on the extent to which the masses will believe the autocrat a villain, and whether they will 
support a heroic challenger to that authority.  Those who continue to ignore identity in the political 
realm may find themselves the targets of strong, quickly mobilized opposition.  
However, these changes may not necessarily imply that autocratic regimes are in the same type of 
danger that autocrats themselves are.  In fact, the “modest harvest” (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 
2013) would suggest that – despite significant ruler turnover – the economic and institutional structures 
that undergird the regimes of the MENA region may continue to be strong.  Certainly, this is the case in 
Egypt, and when combined with the ability of El-Sisi to reconstitute some portion of the Egyptian 
national identity, the Egyptian military has produced a strong counterrevolutionary push. Further, 
scholars who have studied digital media in the aftermath of the Arab Spring have noted that the very 
psycho-social processes that bound opposition movements initially have contributed to their 
fragmentation, a phenomenon aided by the silo effects of digital media (Lynch, Freelon, and Aday 2017; 
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Howard 2013).  Those who were able to ignore significant differences in favor of their common, 
personal hatred of an autocrat may then find it difficult to continue their alliances when they discover 
that their political visions are dramatically different. This implies the possibility of a reverse of the 
blaming strategies of monarchies; instead of the monarchy devolving blame to less powerful actors, the 
regime concentrates blame in a perceptibly powerful, though ultimately expendable autocrat. This 
seems to have been the strategy of the military in Egypt, which had reportedly discussed – and planned 
for - Mubarak’s removal for some time prior to 2011. As an ignorance of identity processes might make 
an autocrat vulnerable, so too might careful attention to these factors by regime operatives help to 
secure their structural influence.   
Despite the difficulties that Arab citizens may face in confronting deeply-rooted regime structures, 
the increased mobilization afforded by digital media strategies does present stability issues for 
autocratic states generally.  Frequent mass protests are highly disruptive, especially for states that rely 
on tourist revenue or military aid that may be withdrawn if they are seen to be too repressive (Lawson 
2015, Beissinger 2017).  Additionally, as digitally-mediate protest mature, it is not a guarantee that 
attention will not eventually fall on the background structures that help to maintain autocratic 
structures beyond the survival of specific leaders.  Certainly, the personalization of an autocrat is a 
powerful motivator of mass protest, but if those forces can be turned toward structural targets, then 
they may work to erode power bases that regimes have relied on for decades.  A recent analysis of the 
function of mega-cities in developing societies makes a similar point, arguing that the command-and-
control power that large capitol cities afford governments – a function of the incentives of global capital 
- are also increasingly vulnerable to disruption if the correct targets are identified (Harvey 2012).  Finally, 
it seems that a newly mobilized Arab citizenry could more readily be recruited for traditional forms of 
organized opposition, seeding the future of a more robust civil society sphere in the region.  In my own 
sample, organizational membership increased from an average of 5.4% across the four cases in 2013, to 
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an average of 14.5% in 2018.  To be sure, though the current threat of new forms of digital organizing 
constitute are more obvious threats to autocrats themselves, regimes would do well to monitor its 
development over time.   
 This report also sets an extensive research agenda around this topic for the MENA region.  First, 
many of the above citations on the processes of identity formation, leadership, and motivations for 
behavior come from studies conducted in the United States and Europe, and significant replication 
efforts should be made to validate those concepts and theories in the context of the MEAN region.  
Second, country-specific experimental work on the triggers related to protest attendance is needed, as 
well as the preceding cues that indicate shifts in affective structure and emotional climes, such that 
scholars might better identify societies that are primed for mass mobilization, and perhaps predict the 
triggers – especially those related to autocratic behavior – that might produce large-scale opposition.  
While these are difficult factors to pin down, research on virality, crowd-behavior, and emotional 
triggers has gained steam in the United States and Europe, and there is little excuse to eschew these 
factors in the MENA region.  Finally, we need better theories for how identities, preferences, and 
affective structures shift over time. Over a decade ago, Weyland (2007) challenged scholars of 
institutional change to better theorize the very change they struggled so mightily to predict, and the 
field has yet to respond effectively to this challenge.  This includes both long and short-term shifts, the 
former a product of incremental structural change that alters the preferences that citizens have for their 
leadership, the latter a product of emotional shifts that – while less stable – may still produce intense 
contentious action for those who fail to predict these shifts, and find themselves on the wrong side of an 
oppositional narrative.  Taken together, this report calls for an increased focus on identity, emotions, 
and other micro-foundations of protest that were assigned secondary relevance for much of the recent 




VII. Appendix A: Full Tables with Demographic Covariates 
 
Table 3 (corresponds to Table 1 above) 
Correlation of Media Usage and Protest Participation 
 Dependent variable: 
 Attendance 
 (Wave 3) (Wave 4) (Wave 5) 
Use Internet for Pol. News 0.226 0.253* 0.115 
 (.180) (.148) (.371) 
Use Internet to Express Pol. Opinions 0.459*** 0.647*** NA 
 (.174) (.154)  
Internet Usage (frequency) -.117** -.097** .064 
 (.050) (.041) (.050) 
Social Media Usage (frequency) NA NA .173** 
   (048) 
Television Usage (frequency) -0.079 -0.061 .136** 
 (.075) (.046) (.050) 
Membership in CSO .631*** 1.24*** 1.09*** 
 (.146) (.135) (.087) 
Membership in Pol. Party 0.780** 1.01** NA 
 (.253) (.329)  
Jordan -2.36*** -1.58*** -1.04*** 
 (.183) (.165) (.112) 
Morocco -1.01*** .136 .876*** 
 (.220) (.137) (.116) 
Egypt -0.368*** -1.70*** -.131 
 (.147) (.182) (.112) 
Tunisia NA NA NA 





















Gender -1.03*** -.617*** -.618*** 
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Constant 1.168** 0.486 1.134*** 
 (0.493) (0.477) (0.371) 
Observations 4,330 4,319 5,203 
Log Likelihood -1,059.045 -1,261.282 -2,367.123 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,156.090 2,560.564 4,768.245 




TABLE 4 (corresponds to Table 2 above) 
 
Motivations for Protest Participation 
 Dependent variable: 
 Attendance 
 (Wave 3) (Wave 4) (Wave 5) 
Economic Anxiety .004 0.015 .008 
 (.606) (.049) (.325) 
Lack of Security -.004 .000 NA 
 (.081) (.072)  
Perceptions of Social Inequality .084 .029 NA 
 (.068) (.060)  
Trust in Government -.153* -.113* .087* 
 (.074) (.068) (.042) 
Trust in Police -.190** -.125* .133*** 
 (.068) (.063) (.037) 
Frustration with Lack of Reform .510 .057 NA 


















































Corruption in State Institutions .510* -.068 .204*** 
 (.226) (.085) (.049) 
Jordan -2.07*** -1.34*** -.681*** 
 (.201) (.181) (.107) 
Morocco -1.03*** .614*** 1.30*** 
 (.229) (.148) (.109) 
Egypt -.709*** -1.49*** 0.394*** 
 (.169) (.193) (.108) 
























































    
Constant 1.020* -0.023 0.698** 
 (0.606) (0.540) (0.325) 
Observations 3,580 3,469 6,783 
Log Likelihood -935.394 -1,156.700 -2,954.250 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,910.789 2,355.401 5,940.501 
Note: *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<0.001 
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VIII. Appendix B: Data Replication
*For a full look at the variables used in this study, including their scale and order, please refer to the
codebooks available at https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/. The list below 
identifies the variables used in each wave, as referenced in the codebook.  Data downloads are available 
at the same page 
Variable List and Description 
- Use Internet for Pol. News 
o Q4101 (Wave 3 and 4), Q421 (Wave 5)
- Use Internet to Express Pol. Opinions 
o Q4102 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Internet Usage (frequency) 
o Q409 (all waves)
- Social Media Usage (frequency) 
o Q424 (Wave 5)
- Television Usage (frequency) 
o Q4061 (Wave 3 and 4), Q423_1 (Wave 5)
- Membership in CSO 
o Q5012-Q50110 (Wave 3), Q501 (Wave 4 and 5)
- Membership in Pol. Party 
o Q501b (Wave 3 and 4)
- Economic Anxiety 
o Q102 (all waves)
- Lack of Security 
o Q105 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Perceptions of Social Inequality 
o Q106 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Trust in Government 
o Q2011 (all waves)
- Trust in Police 
o Q2014 (all waves)
- Frustration with lack of reform 
o Q202 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Corruption in state institutions 
o Q210 (all waves)
- Education 
o Q1003 (all waves)
- Income 
o Q1015 (all waves)
- Urban 
o Q13 (Wave 3 and 4)
- Gender 
o Q1002 (all waves)
- Public Employee 
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o Q1006a (all waves)
- Age 
o Q1001 (all waves)
- Religiosity 
o Q609 (all waves)
- Unemployed 
o Q1005 (all waves)
































































































































































































1002+public+Q1001+Q609+unemployed, data=abdataVfull, family=binomial(link="logit")) 















Q1002+public+Q1001+Q609+unemployed, data=abdataVfull, family=binomial(link="logit")) 
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